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t
In debates over tort reform, images of cancelled parades, discontinued
vaccines, and lawyers in Armani suits hanging over hospital beds compete with
images of drunk drivers, crippled children, and bankrupt accident victims.
Meanwhile, in the quiet corridors of the ivory tower, tort theorists debate
Pareto efficiency versus optimality and the true interpretation of Aristotle.
Into this strange mixture of high emotion and abstraction comes Erploring
the Domain ofAccident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously, a hard-boiled attempt
to get to "just the facts, ma'am," as the iconic gumshoe detective might say.'
The book is indeed a comprehensive review and analysis of the empirical
evidence of the effectiveness of tort law, not only from the experience of the
United States, but from that of other common law countries. Beyond its
obvious value as a reference, the book's central virtue is its sober and balanced
look at many of the less sober and less balanced claims for and against the tort
system, claims of more influence than substance. Despite the vast scope of
materials the book reviews in the course of its 439 pages of text, it is
impeccably organized and written with great clarity. Summaries of each section
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make the book even more accessible for those whose interests are narrower
than those of the authors.
The Sam Spade2 style, however, should not obscure the fact that this book
is not about "just the facts." Its policy arguments and theoretical claims are
sweeping, if sometimes understated by the matter-of-fact presentation. Though
the authors are admirably terse and clear in laying out the "[p]olicy
[i]mplications" of their empirical analyses,3 the evidence they cite does not
always lead inexorably to the conclusions they reach. To bridge those gaps, the
authors must rely on unsupported theoretical assumptions-despite their claims
that theoretical debates about tort law are "in the abstract ... largely sterile,"4
and that "many of the central debates about tort law are less about competing
normative values than they are about competing empirical understandings of
the world." 5
Two such assumptions stand out. First, while professing neutrality as to the
different "goals" of tort law, the authors clearly discount the relevance of
corrective justice theories, demonstrating their own commitment to
instrumental theories of law. Second, except where there is very strong
empirical evidence to the contrary, the authors take a very optimistic view of
the potential of experience-rated insurance schemes6 to solve many deterrence
and compensation problems, without much inquiry into the operation of the
insurance industry. Their optimism springs from a more general theoretical
faith in economic and market principles.
These two assumptions both guide and limit the authors' analysis of the
empirical record. The economic and instrumental assumptions lead the authors
to prefer market-based alternatives to tort law whenever the empirical evidence
is equivocal, obscuring questions about the normativity of law, the nature of
human responsibility, and the possible alternatives to cost-benefit analysis.
These assumptions also lead the authors to emphasize quantitative empirical
research and econometric studies, an approach that may overlook the style,
setting, normative gait, and human quirkiness of various institutions of accident
law. Qualitative research approaches to institutional competence or custom
(such as case studies or histories and law and society work) are sometimes
missing from the otherwise extensive footnotes.7
While these points undermine the authors' insistence that they are theory-
neutral, the assembly of empirical research and the authors' analysis of it make
2. See DASHIELL HAMMETT, THE MALTESE FALCON (1930).
3. See DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW 427 (1996).
4. Id. at 9.
5. Id. at 4.
6. For a discussion of experience rating in insurance, see infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
7. For example, one might have expected the following citations to surface: JERRY L. MASHAW,
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983), or R. SIIEP MELNICK,
REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983).
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the book an essential reference and important contribution to both political and
scholarly debate. Though the following summary focuses on the authors'
policy conclusions and only briefly discusses the most important part of the
book-its meaty review of the empirical literature-that focus reflects the
limitations of space here, not the limitations of the authors' efforts. Part I
summarizes the book's methodology and policy conclusions, Part II
demonstrates how the authors' analysis of the empirical evidence is sometimes
affected by theoretical assumptions, and Part III argues that the authors
misunderstand and misapply principles of corrective justice.
I. METHOD AND CONCLUSIONS
The authors analyze the effectiveness of tort law by describing how it
operates in five "domains": automobile accidents, health care accidents,
product-related accidents, environmentalltoxic injuries, and workplace
accidents. For each of the five areas, the authors evaluate the effectiveness of
both tort doctrine ("inputs") and the scientifically measurable effects of legal
institutions ("outputs") in meeting three goals of tort law taken from the
theoretical literature: deterrence of inefficient accident-causing behavior, victim
compensation, and "corrective justice." The authors' preference is that
wherever feasible we should attempt to internalize accident costs to
classes of activities and individual actors through the design of
appropriate no-fault insurance arrangements rather than using the tort
system. Where such insurance is not feasible, including product
liability, environmental injuries, and other areas not covered in this
study, we would rely on a combination of the tort system (for
corrective justice and some deterrence) and expanded health care and
disability insurance (for compensation).S
Such an approach is necessary because "tort has expanded far beyond the areas
in which it is cost effective." 9
The authors make conclusions and policy recommendations in five areas.
First, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law maintains that tort law does not
adequately compensate auto accident victims. Automobile accidents should be
dealt with through an experience-rated, first-party, no-fault insurance system,
not through tort law. Noneconomic damages should not be compensated. The
no-fault system ought to be supplemented with vigorous enforcement of seat
belt laws, drunk driving laws, and graduated licensing schemes of some sort
to keep younger drivers off the roads longer. Tort law should remain (in all
8. DEwEFS Er AL., supra note 3, at 437.
9. Id. at 414.
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domains) only for victims of intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent
wrongdoing."
Second, tort law is ineffective in compensating medical accident victims.
As with automobile accidents, noneconomic damages should not be
compensated. No-fault alternatives making health care institutions liable, with
insurance premiums experience-rated, would encourage development of more
careful hospital procedures and better oversight of medical staff. Regulatory
reforms should enhance peer review; lessen the burden of proof on, and
expand the range of sanctions available to, professional disciplinary boards;
and increase nonphysician representation on such boards."
Third, the authors believe that product liability should be handled through
the tort system. Liability should no longer be without fault, however, because
strict liability discourages research and development without offsetting gains
in victim compensation. Victims should be compensated through a "better mix
of private first-party disability coverage and a more complete set of social
welfare entitlements."' 2  Victims covered by workers' compensation
entitlements should not be able to sue product manufacturers in tort.
Regulation of products should emphasize consumer information more than
standard setting; if standards are to be set, the safety benefits should be
balanced against manufacturers' costs.'
3
Fourth, the book's analysis suggests that tort law has not been wholly
effective in compensating victims of environmental injuries, due to the
difficulties in proving causation and the difficulty in proving significant
injuries to specific persons (rather than less serious injuries to the general
public). The authors believe government regulation of pollution to be a better
option, though the government should set standards after employing cost-
benefit analysis and should make greater use of market-oriented strategies,
such as marketable pollution permits and effluent charges. Regulations could
also be enforced by private attorneys-general, to augment the limited resources
of enforcement agencies. Where harm is serious and causation clear and
foreseeable, victim compensation should be achievable through the tort
system. 4 Other victims should have to seek compensation through general
social insurance schemes.'
5
Finally, workplace injuries are well suited to the present system of
regulation and no-fault compensation. Product liability suits by injured workers
should not be allowed, though perhaps such suits could be brought by the
10. See id. at 427-28.
I. See id. at 428-29.
12. Id. at 430.
13. See id. at 429-30.
14. See id. at 430-31.
15. See id. at 431, 436.
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workers' compensation insurer. Workers' compensation premiums should be
experience-rated.16
Apart from these specific areas of tort law, the authors make several broad
policy recommendations. For accidents not covered by a separate compensation
scheme, such as environmental or product-related accidents, universal health
care insurance and disability insurance should be available. Even for accidents
covered by other compensation schemes, universal health care coverage should
be available immediately, to be reimbursed by the relevant industry insurer
once the claims are processed, ensuring both compensation and internalization
of costs.' 7
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND PARADIGMS
In any empirical investigation, value-neutral analysis is a fiction. Hence it
is neither surprising nor shameful that the conclusions the authors of Erploring
the Domain of Accident Law reach are not completely supported by the
empirical evidence they cite. It is worthwhile, nonetheless, to articulate the
theories and paradigms they draw upon to resolve conflicts in the record and
to reach their conclusions. Two such background assumptions stand out in the
book: First, the authors do not give much weight to their version of corrective
justice; and second, the authors read the evidence in most of the other domains
they investigate to favor a workers' compensation paradigm that largely
achieves compensatory goals of tort law, but less certainly attains
deterrence/efficiency goals.
A. The Irrelevance of Corrective Justice
Corrective justice holds that tort law should be designed so that
wrongdoers take personal responsibility for recompensing victims of their
wrongdoing.18 This approach, however, makes little difference to the authors'
analysis or conclusions. In the automobile context, for example, the authors opt
for a no-fault system. Their discussion of corrective justice seems designed to
show that their proposal is a fait accompli. The authors emphasize the
expansion of vicarious liability rules and the elevation of the standard of
care,' 9 and they assert that evidence and verdicts in automobile cases are
particularly unreliable because "not only do litigants deliberately attempt to put
their actions in the best light, but lack of attention is often a factor in
16. See id. at 431-32.
17. See id. at 432-38.
18. See infra Part III for a more accurate and extens:ve discussion of the definition of corrective
justice.
19. See DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3, at 40 (discussing Canadian legal system)
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automobile accidents from the very outset., 20  The authors also assert,
counterintuitively,21 that many cases are settled "'without resort to an accurate
definition of fault' ',22  because they are settled "without reference to a
lawyer. '23 The authors further argue that corrective justice is irrelevant
because uninsured drivers often cannot compensate victims, insured drivers do
not directly compensate victims, and finally, victims themselves place "little
importance" on being compensated by the culpable party except in drunk-
24 atodriving cases. The authors conclude that it is "empirically questionable to
emphasize the 'symbol of corrective justice' to defend the current automobile
liability regime." In short, the authors argue that because we have moved
away from corrective justice ideals in order to compensate victims, there is no
point in retaining the remaining vestiges of corrective justice doctrines.
This argument contrasts sharply with that in the product liability chapter.
There, the authors stress the shortcomings of current product liability law from
the corrective justice perspective: Liability is strict, not fault-based, and claims
are processed so slowly that many victims choose not to pursue them.26 Yet
in the product liability context, unlike the automobile context, the authors
argue that this fait accompli of strict liability should be undone:
We do not believe that the performance of strict liability with respect
to deterrence and compensation justifies its retention, given its costs.
Instead, we believe that product liability should be reintegrated with
the negligence regime that still prevails in most other parts of the
common law world. This essentially reflects a corrective justice view
of tort law.2
This inconsistency exemplifies a more pervasive sense that corrective justice
20. Id. at 41. By comparison, when discussing the deterrent effects of tort law in this area, the authors
say:
With respect to findings of liability, the relatively straightforward nature of most automobile
accidents seems to suggest considerable precision in their resolution. Indeed, in one study of
352 insurance claims, more than 90% of cases involved uncontroversial evidence of fault....
On the other hand, a recent British study reveals that, for litigated claims, redistributive
goals play a significant role in actual findings of liability.... Assuming (as seems plausible)
that these distributive concerns produce more findings of liability than warranted under a strict
Learned Hand test, one might anticipate excessive deterrence.
Id. at 18-19. While the authors give a very balanced analysis of accuracy of claims resolution in the section
on deterrence, they focus more on the inaccuracy of litigated claims' outcomes in the section on corrective
justice. Perhaps it is a matter of tone or emphasis, but my impression is that the statement of facts for
corrective justice has a touch of the litigator about it.
21. Corrective justice need not occur within the court system. See infra notes 136-38 and
accompanying text.
22. DEWEES Er AL., supra note 3, at 41 (quoting Bruce Dunlop, No Fault Automobile Insurance and
the Negligence Action: An Expensive Anomaly, 13 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 439, 445 (1975)).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 42.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 213.
27. Id. at 429.
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analysis is largely irrelevant to the authors' conclusions. The deeper reasons
for the incompatibility of corrective justice with the authors' project are
explored in Part III, but for present purposes it suffices to note that the authors
reject corrective justice theory in practice, albeit not explicitly, and invoke it
only as a makeweight to support conclusions they reach on other grounds. The
authors' conclusions ultimately rest on either deterrence or compensation
rationales. The small role that corrective justice seems to play in these
conclusions leaves only deterrence and compensation to explain. As the
following Sections argue, compensation holds the most sway in the authors'
analysis and accounts for their preference for insurance schemes like workers'
compensation.
B. Workplace Injuries: The Paradigm
Given my sense that corrective justice considerations have little effect on
the authors' conclusions, the compensation and deterrence purposes of tort law
provide the main argument of the book. Unsurprisingly, the authors conclude
that tort law is an inadequate system of compensation in every area of accident
law they examine. Indeed, without even looking at the evidence of court delays
and related problems, it seems obvious that if compensation is the only goal
of tort law, the cost of adjudicating causation and fault is just grit in the
wheels, inefficient by definition. The key question, then, is whether tort law
is worth retaining for its deterrent effects. When the empirical evidence on this
question is equivocal (as it almost always is), the authors prefer an approach
resembling workers' compensation. -'
Since workers' compensation is the authors' paradigm, it is odd that it is
the last accident domain they explore in the book. But last is certainly not
least, as the authors emphatically conclude that workers' compensation is more
successful than tort law in achieving the goals of both compensation and
deterrence, despite the obvious historical difficulties in judging the
effectiveness of tort law in the workplace. Although the authors try to
extrapolate from turn-of-the-century workplace tort law, the historical evidence
is confused by the flux in workplace tort doctrine during its twilight. The
authors recognize as much:
When workers' compensation insurance was first introduced, the
tort law applicable to workplace accidents was in a process of rapid
evolution. The nineteenth-century doctrines of voluntary assumption
of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and contributory negligence-all of
which had acted as bars to tort recovery by injured workers-were
28. See infra Sections II.C-D.
1997] 1275
The Yale Law Journal
being transformed or discarded, and workers were succeeding in an
increasing number of cases.29
As a result, the two empirical studies that attempted to measure whether the
accident rate decreased once tort doctrine expanded and/or workers'
compensation schemes began were conflicting: One found a significant
reduction in deaths in machinery accidents, the other found higher accident
rates in the coal industry.30 The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)2
was associated with reduced accidents in the railroad industry, and risk-rated
workers' compensation premiums were associated with reduced accidents in
the German sugar industry.32 The authors admit that while efficient accident
rules may be industry-specific, 33 it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether expansive tort rules or workers' compensation systems are better
deterrents. But they conclude that, in view of the uncertainty of the empirical
evidence, there is no reason to resurrect tort law.
34
The authors also conclude that workers' compensation is more effective
than regulatory alternatives to the tort system. Due to the burdens of
administrative procedure, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) has set few standards, and those standards it has set have been
inefficient and peripheral in altering accident rates.35 Inspections seldom
happen, fines are low, and the impact on accident rates is little or none.36
On the other hand, the most dramatic of the workers' compensation studies
cited by the authors concludes that experience-rated workers' compensation
insurance has reduced work-related fatalities by almost forty percent. 37 The
authors "accept the evidence that this effect is greater than that created by the
tort system or that created by U.S. federal occupational safety and health
regulation," 38 but not uncritically. They recognize that workers' compensation
schemes tend to undercompensate victims of occupational disease, again
because of the difficulty of determining causation.39 They also fault the
scheme of compensating victims of permanent partial disabilities by means of
29. DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3, at 349 (citations omitted).
30. See id. at 352-53.
31. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). FELA was originally enacted in 1908.
32. See DEWEES E7 AL., supra note 3, at 353-54.
33. See id. at 353. One explanation for the different findings in the coal industry was that safety
supervision was more expensive there than in factories, so other forms of safety supervision did not replace
the lost incentives of workers to supervise each other as they did under the former fellow-servant rule. See
id,
34. See id. at 355, 431-32.
35. See id. at 362-78. One glaring problem has been OSHA's failure to reckon with multiple-exposure
problems for toxic substances, instead of setting exposure levels one-by-one. See id. at 364.
36. See id. at 366-77. OSHA's regulation of asbestos, however, did seem to have significant effects.
See id. at 376-77.
37. See id. at 382.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 391.
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a schedule, because disabilities affect workers in different fields differently.40
One of the authors' major policy suggestions is that workers should no longer
be able to sue manufacturers of defective products that cause work-related
harms if they receive workers' compensation." This suggestion, however, is
not clearly derived from the empirical work, and no argument is made for it
apart from the speculation that it would decrease products liability litigation
and bring U.S. practice into conformity with that of other common law
jurisdictions.42 This drastic and sparsely argued suggestion rests in part on the
authors' general criticisms of product liability law-criticisms that are not
strongly supported by the evidence.43
C. Automobile Accidents
The authors' preference for workers' compensation-type schemes is
apparent in their discussion of automobile accidents. For the authors, the data
are clear that the tort system is much slower and less certain to compensate
victims of traffic accidents than is a no-fault system." . The story here is a
familiar one. Victims with serious losses are undercompensated because they
often choose to settle for less rather than wait for more; victims with minimal
losses are overcompensated so defendants can avoid the greater costs of further
litigation; 5 a great percentage of the money paid in tort goes to transaction
costs.
46
The question becomes whether a no-fault, first-party insurance program,
which would better compensate auto accident victims, would itself create more
accidents by eliminating the deterrent effects of tort law. The authors examine
several studies that show such an effect, but after a detailed examination, deem
them methodologically flawed.47 They conclude that while there is evidence
that no-fault schemes lead to increased accident rates, this evidence comes
primarily from jurisdictions (such as Quebec and New Zealand) where no-fault
premiums are not risk-rated.48 Experience rating, they hypothesize, would
make up for lost deterrence.49
40. See id.
41. See id. at 430.
42. See id.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 88-97.
44. See DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3, at 55-62.
45. See id at 19.
46. See id. at 62.
47. See id. at 22-26. The authors subject these data to much more searching scrutiny than most of the
other evidence that they cite. Cf. id. at 382 (accepting evidence of deterrent powers of workcr-'
compensation).
48. See id. at 22-26. The lack of risk-rating means that premiums do not depend on pnor accident
history or any attributes of the driver positively correlated with increased risk. See id at 25-26
49. See id. at 26.
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This hypothesis is rather optimistic, as the authors do not address in detail
how such no-fault schemes could be financed. They acknowledge the problem
of uninsured drivers, 50 but do not discuss how to establish a system of no-
fault insurance that is both universal/compulsory and risk-rated. The problem
of uninsured drivers, moreover, strains the workers' compensation analogy. If
drivers are uninsured, they will not be subject to deterrence incentives from
higher premium costs. If uninsured drivers as a group are more reckless than
average, first-party insurance will impose the costs of their accidents on parties
less at fault, overdeterring this group. Employers, by contrast, are more easily
monitored and less likely to remain uninsured. For a workers' compensation-
type scheme to be feasible in the automobile context, the authors must explain
how insurance payments will be made and how experience rating will occur.
They reject a flat-fee payment at licensing as insufficiently risk-rated. 5' Nor
do they discuss other options, such as pay-at-the-pump premiums that would
link insurance payments to amount of driving (though not to past accident
history).
The authors also look to regulatory alternatives to make up for any loss in
deterrence, concluding that mandatory seat belt laws work, speed limits may
or may not work, suspending the licenses of drunk drivers seems to work,
random breath-testing of drivers seems to work, and raising minimum ages for
drinking and for driving shows promise.52 Higher levels of enforcement, they
decide, have also proven more important than penalty levels. 53 Though the
authors are optimistic about the deterrent effects of these alternatives to the tort
system, at bottom the authors are willing to trade off the possibility of loss of
deterrence to achieve better compensation. This conclusion, though perfectly
reasonable, is not entirely supported by "just the facts."
D. Medical Accidents
The authors conclude that experience-rated no-fault insurance is also more
effective than tort litigation in the medical sphere. According to the authors,
medical accident litigation has an even poorer record for compensation than
automobile accident litigation.54 It is slow, bars many claimants, makes proof
of malpractice very difficult, entails high transaction costs, undercompensates
the seriously injured, overcompensates the less seriously injured, and gives
lower-income people less for their implicit premium than it gives higher-
50. See id. at 39.
51. See id. at 25.
52. See id. at 43-48.
53. See id. at 416.
54. See id. at 112-17.
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income people.55 Less clear for the authors is whether tort litigation is worth
preserving for its deterrent effects.56
According to the authors, malpractice liability fails the test of optimal
deterrence even from the "input" side of legal doctrine. First, doctors, not
hospitals, are held primarily liable for medical malpractice, whereas "standards
of care must be optimally defined in order to encourage potential injurers to
make efficient (cost-justified) investments in the avoidance of injuries," so that
"one might expect a strong emphasis on institutional liability."' "7 The authors
argue that hospitals are more efficient cost avoiders in this context, because
they can control doctor incompetence through personnel policies, as well as
develop institutional procedures that may reduce accidents. Because of
economies of scale, hospitals can also better afford to keep tabs on current
practice standards and avoid exaggerated precautions due to uncertainty."8
Second, instead of the traditional Learned Hand test of liability, which in
theory establishes appropriate incentives for potential defendants to take
care,5 9 malpractice liability depends on customary practice.6 Customary
standards may underdeter because of "informational asymmetries and provider
self-interest," or overdeter because "extensive health insurance coverage"
allows patients to avoid the costs of additional precautions. 6' Third,
restrictions on pain and suffering damages, abolition of the collateral source
rule, and rules limiting compensation for wrongful death prevent damages from
reflecting the full social cost of injuries. 62 Finally, difficulties in making
accurate judgments about liability in this technical field, perhaps contributing
to the "substantial number of nonmeritorious claims" and the "considerable
shortfall" in meritorious claims, also make efficient rules difficult to
achieve.63 Current forms of liability insurance contribute to the problem,
according to the authors, because malpractice insurance premiums are typically
not experience-rated, but instead are based on specialty or geography alone.
Insurance therefore removes much of any remaining incentive the liability rules
might have established, and increases in liability insurance seem to be passed
on to patients. 64
55. See id. at 117.
56. See i&. at 103-04.
57. Id. at 97.
58. See id. at 103.
59. See i. at 98.
60. But see infra note 206 for a discussion of the role of custom, not just cost-benefit analysis, in the
Learned Hand test.
61. DEwEas ET AL., supra note 3. at 98 (footnote omitted). The authors add that "(wlhether customary
medical practice exceeds or falls short of the efficient level of care depends on which of these two effects
dominates." Id. (footnote omitted).
62. See id. at 98-99.
63. See id at 99.
64. See id at 101-02.
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The authors admit that the "output" analysis of the effect of tort claims on
medical practice is "limited and inconclusive." 65 One analysis showed a
modest reduction in negligent injuries due to malpractice litigation. 66 Two
econometric studies found correlations between increases in malpractice
premium levels and the frequency of specific diagnostic procedures.67 Surveys
of physicians showed that they attributed increased recordkeeping, increased
referrals, increased testing, and other procedures to malpractice liability, though
the authors find these surveys too self-selecting to be reliable.6" The authors
conclude that "while the legal standard of customary practice may help
perpetuate questionable diagnostic and therapeutic practices, empirical
investigation seems to suggest that medical and technological innovation is
driven more by profession-specific factors than by changes in the medical-legal
environment. '69 The authors do concede that the threat of liability may
dissuade physicians who favor a noncustomary form of treatment, may
encourage overuse of fancy medical technologies that would "look good" in
litigation, and may lead doctors to adopt unjustified precautions out of
uncertainty and fear of suit.
70
Finally, the authors ask whether the changes in medical practice due to tort
law resulted in reductions in injury (rather than better documentation for trial).
They conclude, based on the limited studies in the area, that "it is reasonable
to suppose that the marginal effect of [liability-induced diagnostic
procedures] ... is slight."'', They do give tort law credit, however, for
changing the way doctors talk with patients about the risks of treatment, as
well as for spurring hospitals to become involved in risk management
programs that decrease both malpractice claims and medical injuries.72
Although it is impossible to tell whether the tort system is responsible for
significant reductions in the accident rate, institutional liability and informed
consent requirements have probably had some effects. Despite the
inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence, however, the authors opt for
another no-fault scheme, financed through risk-rated premiums paid by
institutions (or solo practitioners).73 They recognize that the administrative
process will still have to determine causation, which in the medical area is
often difficult.74 But they point to no-fault schemes for medical accident
compensation in New Zealand, Finland, and Sweden, concluding optimistically
65. Id. at 104.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 104-05.
68. See id. at 105, 156-57 n.106.
69. Id. at 105 (footnote omitted).
70. See id. at 106-07.
71. Id. at 110.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 428-29.
74. See id. at 136-38.
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that "despite considerable difficulties in defining the concept of a medical
injury and in establishing a causal relationship between medical care and
adverse outcomes, appeal decisions in New Zealand and Indemnity Conditions
in Sweden and Finland appear to have resolved most of these dilemmas
without major controversy."' " To decrease the costs of such a scheme, the
authors propose eliminating damages for pain and suffering and for the first
one or two months of lost income.76 They propose strengthening deterrence
through alternative regulatory procedures, such as enhancement of peer review
and professional discipline, although they reject direct governmental regulation
of medical care as too difficult to administer and too fluid for rigid
standards.77
Again, the authors decide, despite "inconclusive" evidence, that the tort
system does not provide sufficient deterrence to be worth its inefficiencies in
compensating victims. 78 Again, they support a system of no-fault insurance
financed by actors inside the industry, despite potential difficulties (and
inefficiencies) in defining the class of injuries covered.
E. Product-Related Accidents
Although they prefer no-fault liability in other areas, the authors do not
suggest it in the context of product liability. They reject no-fault compensation
schemes in this area on the ground that it is too difficult (and hence too
expensive) to distinguish accidents caused by product defects from all
accidents "involving products," for which industry-specific compensation
would be too expensive and too loosely connected to accident-causing industry
conduct. 79 What is not clear, however, is why proving a nexus between a
product defect and an injury is any more difficult administratively than proving
that a medical injury is the unintended or unexpected result of medical
treatment.80 It would seem that the authors are either too optimistic about
medical no-fault systems, as I would suggest, or too pessimistic about product
no-fault systems.
Yet despite the unavailability of an alternative compensation scheme, the
authors do not applaud current product liability doctrine. Though strict liability
for products allows more victims to sue than a negligence regime, the authors
suggest that the requirement that plaintiffs prove a product defect cancels much
of the victim compensation advantage over negligence doctrine."1 As to
75. Id. at 141.
76. See id. at 428-29.
77. See id. at 123, 428-29.
78. See id. at 104, 428-29.
79. See id- at 244-45.
80. See id at 137.
81. See id. at 211.
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whether strict liability is an effective and efficient deterrent, the authors find
the evidence of effectiveness inconclusive and the arguments for efficiency
unpersuasive. They recommend, as a result, a return to negligence
principles.83 First, the authors examine industrial surveys. These results were
mixed-some reported that products liability enhanced safety or safety
instructions, others that it induced layoffs, caused product lines to be
discontinued, stifled innovation, and hampered international competition. 4
Product liability decisions tell a similar story. Some studies concluded that
innovations would have been made without pressure from liability suits; others
that liability suits were necessary to force safety improvements; others that
liability suits had no effect on research and development expenditures; and still
others that the mere cost of defending unsuccessful liability suits forced price
increases, plant closures, and declines in innovation. Econometric studies
indicated that "liability increases safety incentives but beyond a certain
threshold provides negative incentives for research and development. 8 6 The
data are also inconclusive as to whether liability has lowered the rates of
injuries caused by products, because it is impossible to distinguish accidents
involving defective products from accidents connected in some way with
nondefective products.8 7
The authors' conclusion that tort law has not created efficient care
incentives, however, is ultimately drawn not from the empirical evidence
"outputs," but from their analysis of tort doctrine "inputs" in this context. This
approach differs markedly from their analysis of other areas of accident law
and relies solely on general economic assumptions, not industry-specific data,
creating a tension with the methodology of the rest of the book. The authors
conclude that evaluating the efficiency of strict liability for products means
asking whether consumers underestimate product risks. If so, then a negligence
rule would lead consumers to purchase more risky products than would be
efficient, since the safety of a product is only partially reflected in its price.
Strict liability, which makes the price reflect all the risks, not just those the
nonnegligent manufacturer can avoid, is a good way to compensate for
informational imperfections in the market for products. Based on some
psychological lab experiments that support the view that consumers
82. See id. at 204-05.
83. See id. at 205.
84. See id. at 197-98. The authors note, however, that these surveys involved responses by CEOs of
manufacturing corporations and had low response rates, which suggests significant sample bias. See id. at
198.
85. See id. at 198-201.
86. Id. at 201. The studies concluded that such a threshold had been reached in industries
manufacturing (among other things) asbestos, tires, bathroom fixtures, safety valves, power tools, saws,
food slicers, and laboratory apparatuses. See id.
87. See id. at 203. For example, the authors cite one study which found a decrease in the auto death
rate between 1970 and 1975. However, the study attributed the decrease to higher gas prices and decreases
in speed limits. See id.
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overestimate rather than underestimate risk, or at least are unsystematic in
assessing risk, the authors conclude that strict liability for products is not
warranted. 8 The authors bolster this conclusion with evidence that products
are not less safe in other common law jurisdictions, including Canada, in
which regular negligence rules apply to products. 9 Given the homogenizing
effect of international markets, however, that safety level could also be the
result of higher U.S. standards.
The analysis that makes consumer risk assessment the fulcrum of the
rejection of strict liability for products is troubling in several respects. First,
the authors overstate the "strictness" of strict liability. Most commentators and
the recent draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability recognize that
strict liability applies only to manufacturing defects, not to design or warning
defects, which are subject instead to negligence standards.' Manufacturing
defect cases do not seem to be the authors' primary target, since "this liability
test does have the advantage of clarity and ease of application."' Second, the
88. See id. at 191,204-05, 246 nn.28-30 (citing RICHARD NISBEt" & LEE Ross. HL A INFERENCE
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980): Alan Schwartz. Proposals for Products
Liability Reform: A Theoretical Syntheses, 97 YALE L.J. 353. 381 1988)). A more recent reve'% of the
literature, not cited by the authors, suggests that consumers tend to underestimate product nsks and do not
properly understand warnings or product information. See Howard Latin. **Good' Warnings. lBd Prducs.
and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193. 1233-35 (1994).
89. See DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3. at 205. Throughout the book. the authors tend to support
solutions that accord with Canadian practice. See. e.g.. id. at 414 ("Canada has already taken sonte of the
steps that we recommend, providing useful experience as to their performance We beliese that our
recommendations would provide substantial net benefits for Americans.").
90. In this regard, the authors' citation to Beshada v' Johns-Manville Products Corp. 447 A 2d 539
(NJ. 1982), see DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3, at 193, for the current state of warning defect la" ts a bit
unfair, since Beshada has not been generally followed. Even tn its own jurisdiction. it vas limited to
asbestos cases, see Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374. 388 (NJ. 1984). and New Jersey still requires
plaintiffs to prove that the kind of asbestos at issue was dangerous. see Becker v. Baron Bros.. 649 A.2d
613, 617 (NJ. 1994). Further, in 1987 the New Jersey legislature provided that the state-of-the-art defense
would apply to design defect suits, see NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(l) (West 1987). and that only
reasonable warnings would be required, see id. § 2A:58C-4. The courts have construed reasonable warning
to include state-of-the-art factors. See, e.g., Fabian v. Minster Mach. Co., 609 A.2d 487. 494 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1992). To be fair to the authors, however, though no published decision yet so holds, the
Beshada doctrine may linger for asbestos cases, since the 1987 products liability law does not apply to
environmental torts, see NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-6, which the courts hae construed as includtng
asbestos, see Ripa v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 660 A.2d 521. 534 (NJ. Super. Ct App. Div. 1995).
cert. denied, 665 A.2d I111 (NJ. 1995); Stevenson v. Keene Corp., 603 A.2d 521. 526 (NJ Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992), aff'd, 620 A.2d 1047 (NJ. 1993) (per cunam).
The new draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability requires that fatlure-to-, arn liability
for harm caused by prescription drugs or medical devtces be based on "'foreseeable risks" See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8(d) & cmt. g (Tentative Draft No 2. 1995);
see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled
Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1257, 1264 (1993) (arguing that new Restatement should clarify
ambiguity of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or ToRTS § 402A cmt. k (1977) as to whether foreseeablity of risk
is necessary element of failure-to-war liability); David G. Owen. Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the
"Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743. 761-66 (discussing foreseeability and
reasonableness principles adopted by draft Restatement for failure-to-warn liability). The negligence
orientation of products liability is not so recent. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence
and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963 (1981) (assessing recent changes in law of strct
liability according to negligence principles).
91. DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3, at 192.
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argument against a risk-benefit test for design defects is flawed. The authors
contend that if consumers are perfectly informed, the demand, price, and hence
industry profits for a product will reflect its net utility (its usefulness given its
dangers), so that any balancing of this net utility against risks counts the risks
twice. The authors cite psychological studies that show that on average,
consumers do not underestimate risks, so prices must reflect net utility, and the
risk-benefit test is inappropriate."2 Even assuming that the psychology is right,
however, it is a long way from general risk aversion to perfect information,
and longer still from perfect information to reflective decisions made upon
such information.93
The history of products liability belies any perfect information assumption.
Firms have not competed on safety features 94 -in a few instances, as in the
asbestos industry, companies conspired to keep adverse safety information
from the public 5 and governmental regulation was necessary.96 The
manufacturers themselves do not have perfect risk information at the time a
product is marketed. Even attempts by government agencies to make risk
information public have failed, because it is so difficult to judge by aggregate
injury statistics whether a product defect has caused the injury.97 A general
risk aversion on the part of consumers, therefore, is not sufficient to prove that
prices will accurately reflect risks. Economic assumptions of perfect
competition seem to cloud our detectives' assessment of the facts.98
92. See id. at 190-92.
93. Indeed, as the authors point out, if information is perfect and transaction costs are zero, either
negligence or strict liability will be efficient, as parties will bargain to the best outcome. See id. at 189-90.
94. Product advertising has changed from focusing on information to focusing on image. See Ronald
K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 700-07 (1993).
With a few exceptions (such as luxury cars), manufacturers are reluctant to mention safety information in
ads. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 562 n. 15 (1985) (arguing
that "producers face disincentives to advertise safety"). Though some authors argue that firms do compete
with respect to warranties, they acknowledge that few consumers read them. See Michael 1. Meyerson, The
Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 615
n.170 (1990) ("The seller's advertisement may be the only prepurehase information about safety available
to the consumer."); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297,
1346-47 (1981).
95. See Ripa, 660 A.2d at 536-37.
96. An interesting empirical study might be made of the effects of regulation on advertising, that is,
whether regulatory standards motivate companies to begin competing on safety. Certainly new car buyers
might suspect there is such a link. Though the authors discuss the benefits of governmental information
policies, they do not discuss the information effect of regulatory policies. They also do not discuss the
changes in product advertisement generally, though that might be a fertile ground for finding or evaluating
changes in safety competition. See Collins & Skover, supra note 94, at 706-07 (arguing that current ads
usually do not convey information); Note, Harnessing Madison Avenue: Advertising and Products Liability
Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 895 (1994) (arguing that insufficient attention has been paid to advertising as
mode of conveying safety information).
97. See DEWEES Er AL., supra note 3, at 215-16.
98. Though I cannot do it justice here, the authors also include a great deal of informative discussion
of the relative efficacy of regulatory alternatives to products liability law. They conclude that information
disclosure policies are more efficient than minimum quality standards, because most of these standards are




In one of the most balanced and exhaustive chapters of the book, the
authors suggest that a no-fault compensation scheme is as unworkable for
environmental injuries as for products liability. Here, however, the reason for
the problem lies in the diffuse nature of environmental injuries. Most
environmental accidents affect many people to a limited extent, rendering
compensation a less pressing (and perhaps unworkable) goal. In cases where
tort law works-that is, those involving large, directly provable losses by a
few plaintiffs-the authors conclude that traditional tort law does provide some
deterrence. 99 Tort law's usefulness is limited, however, because most often
these victims are undercompensated, and defendants are therefore
underdeterred.Y°°
The authors conclude, however, that tort liability should remain in its
limited, traditional form. Where environmental losses are more thinly spread
and uncertainly caused, however, and therefore not amenable to traditional
forms of environmental tort litigation, the authors contend that regulation is the
better source of additional deterrence. The discussion of environmental torts
features a great deal of comment on the relative efficacy of regulatory
alternatives. The authors believe that command and control forms of regulation
do work, although they criticize the way in which standards are set and
question whether such regulation passes a cost-benefit test.'' They also cite
evidence approving, with some caveats, the use of disclosure laws, marketable
permits, and effluent charges, and questioning the efficacy of subsidies. In the
end, however:
The enormous uncertainty associated with estimates of the
benefits of controlling many pollutants necessarily means that the
process of selecting a regulatory limit for such pollutants will be
highly contentious, with scientific evidence available to support
widely divergent limits. The regulatory process does not eliminate the
uncertainty that causes tort litigation to be so unsatisfactory.
Regulation does reduce the stakes, however, since it imposes costs
only for future control, while litigation may impose enormous
penalties for past discharges. We believe that regulation is better
suited to controlling pollution than is tort litigation precisely because
99. See id. at 288-89.
100. Tort liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation. and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994), comes under special cnticism. Strict liability, joint and
several liability, and retroactivity do not provide incentives for efficient accident prescntion. and the
expense of CERCLA suits is 21% to 88% of total outlays for cleanup See DE'kEES EtAL.. su1pra note 3.
at 271.
101. See DEwEES El AL., supra note 3, at 320-21
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of the great uncertainty regarding the harm caused by many
pollutants. 
02
The difficulties of proving that toxic substances cause injury make tort a poor
deterrent and regulation a slightly less poor substitute. Compensation, the
authors conclude, must come from general social insurance, not from industry-
specific sources, except where causation is clear and tort law can function in
traditional ways.' °3 Here because uncertainty seems so intractable, the
authors resolve their doubts in favor of the existing institutions, rather than in
favor of change.
F. Risk Rating and the Insurance Industry
Given the authors' overwhelming preference for achieving compensation
and deterrence through insurance, and their otherwise exhaustive review of the
literature, it is surprising that they do not evaluate the effectiveness of various
insurance schemes" or of insurance regulation or reform. The authors
recognize that risk evaluation and rating by the insurance industry is less than
perfect, 10 5 especially in the area of medical malpractice insurance.1
6
Whether these imperfections can be addressed through regulation or
deregulation, or whether insurance must be taken over by government
administration, is not addressed.
Perhaps because the authors do not analyze the insurance industry, they
tend to assume that either governmental insurance schemes or the private
insurance market can generate appropriately risk-rated no-fault alternatives.
The authors are vague about whether they expect these no-fault alternatives to
be available through the private insurance market. They do mention, however,
that for general health care insurance, "a private system ... might be more
acceptable in the United States."'
0 7
There are basically two ways in which insurance policies can reflect risk.
First, the insurance company can come up with categories that reflect different
risks--called feature rating-and charge higher premiums to those in higher-
risk categories.' °s Feature rating may or may not provide incentives for safer
102. Id. at 321.
103. See id. at 430-31, 436.
104. They do include sections discussing the nature of available liability insurance for each of the
types of injury discussed, but there is little discussion of why the policies are structured as they are, or how
that structure may be affected by regulation. See id. at 19-20, 101, 191-93, 277-78.
105. See id. at 20 ("Nevertheless, the extent to which liability insurers actually employ (experience
rating and deductibles] varies from one area of tort law to another, depending on the applicable moral
hazards, the costs of implementing such measures, and the structure of the insurance industry involved.").
106. See id. at 101.
107. Id. at 436.
108. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L.
REv. 403, 413-14 (1985).
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behavior, depending on what features are used. Historically, the expense of
acquiring more "individualized" information has led to the use of proxies for
risk, like sex or geography, that give insureds little incentive to take
precautions and may even lead to forms of redlining.' ° It is not clear,
moreover, to what extent insurance companies have the incentive to generate
accurately risk-rated policies. Getting more information from insureds is
expensive and is often not justified by the ability to locate markets in which
competitive premiums can be offered. Because of the cost of information,
companies have limited incentives to investigate the efficiency of new
classification systems."0
The second way to tailor premiums to risk is to base them on past claims
experience, a method called "experience rating....' The authors prefer this
method because it allows the insured to decide how best to lower accident
rates and claims, rather than making insurance companies into privatized juries,
articulating standards of due care. But where smaller insured institutions or
individuals are involved, basing premiums on past claims experience may
punish those with bad luck, as well as those with careless practices." 2 The
authors address neither how premium cost is or should be affected by claims
experience in order to have efficient deterrent effects,"' nor where those who
have poor claims experience can get insurance when the private market refuses
to offer it. Finally, the authors do not say whether the market will generate
experience rating, whether government insurance regulation should require
companies to write experience-rated policies, whether regulatory agencies
should monitor or set policy rates, or whether such regulation makes
experience rating unprofitable. Without this additional information, the
proposals for no-fault auto insurance and no-fault medical accident insurance
lack a firm basis in fact and rely almost entirely on theory.
III. INSTRUMENTALISM AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
The second, and more encompassing, theoretical perspective the authors
take is an instrumental approach to law. Their very approach to the subject
109. See Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversv. 131 U PA L REV 517. 529-30
(1983); Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Inportant to Be Left to the Actuaries. 19 U MICI
J.L. REFORM 349, 365-66 (1986). "Redlining" is the denial of co~eragc to classcs of applicants based on
discriminatory criteria such as race, sex. or neighborhood.
110. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE. LEGAL TIIOR. A\D PLBLIC
POLICY 96 (1986).
111. See Abraham, supra note 108, at 413-14.
112. See Sugarman, supra note 94, at 576-77 (cnticizing expenence rating as invo' ing too much lag
time, too little effect on premiums, and too little connection with carelessness in individual or small
institutional settings); see also id. at 615-16 (arguing that insurance classification practices defeat goal of
cost internalization).
113. Cf Lori L. Darling, Note, The Applicabihiy of Experience Rating to Medical Malpractice
Insurance, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 255 (1987) (arguing in favor of expcnencc-ratcd premiums
incorporating peer review).
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matter-evaluating tort law by evaluating its effects-demonstrates this starting
point. The authors identify three goals that tort law is meant to achieve:
deterrence, compensation, and corrective justice. They find these goals
articulated in the theoretical literature, and instead of joining the debate over
which one is the appropriate focus of attention, they simply evaluate each
accident domain by each measure of success." 4 While this procedure seems
appropriate for the goals of deterrence and compensation," it jars with
corrective justice theory, which sees tort law as expressing or embodying,
rather than serving or implementing, social norms."16 Indeed, the authors
recognize that "a corrective justice perspective on tort law, unlike both the
deterrence and compensation perspectives, is noninstrumental,"" 7 and so they
"devote less attention in this book to the empirical evidence on the operation
of the tort system from a corrective justice perspective."" 8 It is remarkable
that they believe it possible to "evaluate" tort law as corrective justice by
examining empirical effects at all. As I will argue, not only is it impossible to
evaluate the effectiveness of tort law in achieving corrective justice along the
lines the authors suggest, but an instrumentalist approach to corrective justice
also necessarily misunderstands it. Corrective justice theory, at its best, is an
attempt to understand the normative basis of our laws. It aims at self-
understanding rather than prescribing or measuring law's effects. Just as
empirical evaluation of the sort the authors conduct is not meaningful from the
perspective of corrective justice, our pursuit of self-knowledge through
corrective justice is not comprehensible from an instrumentalist standpoint.
A. Defining Corrective Justice
These broad remarks, however, require a broad caveat. "Corrective justice"
itself is a many-splintered thing. Theorists who use the term have many
different conceptions of what moral or normative principle best expresses the
114. The authors state that they
accept that all three of the major normative values identified-deterrence, compensation, and
corrective justice-are legitimate normative values and are worthy of vindication, in the case
of accidents, in appropriate domains of the legal system. However, the critical question is not
which values are more important but which policy instruments are best suited to vindicate which
values.
DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3, at 9.
115. See Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 954
(1994) (arguing that deterrence and compensation theories of tort law are "separated by disagreements
which are empirical and contingent" but share view of law as "an expendable instrument with which to
administer incentives and implement policy choices").
116. Ernest Weinrib, for example, says:
Private law, I will claim, is to be grasped only from within and not as the juridical
manifestation of a set of extrinsic purposes. If we must express this intelligibility in terms of
purpose, the only thing to be said is that the purpose of private law is to be private law.
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (1995).




core of tort law." 9 The four most prominent theories are Richard Epstein's
causal theory, George Fletcher's nonreciprocal risk theory, Ernest Weinrib's
formalist/rationalist theory, and Jules Coleman's ecumenical theory. Though
I briefly explain all four, Weinrib's and Coleman's theories are the best
developed and will generally serve as models for the analysis developed in this
Part.
20
Richard Epstein's theory requires envisioning all tort injuries as invasions
of a preexisting property interest. As with property generally, any invasion an
actor causes to another's material or bodily "property" or "rights" must be
compensated. As causation is the only link necessary for liability in most
cases, liability is strict, and there is no need for any sort of intent element.' 2'
George Fletcher explains the nature of tort liability as liability for harm
caused through the imposition of nonreciprocal risk, that is, "a risk greater in
degree and different in order from those created by the victim and imposed on
the defendant."' 122 Strict liability for dangerous activities captures this insight,
but Fletcher extends the analogy to negligence: Careless driving in the midst
of careful drivers also imposes nonreciprocal risks. The difficulty lies,
however, in explaining the connection between the wrong of imposing extra
risk on others and the remedy of paying for harms caused thereby.'
23
In Ernest Weinrib's theory, by contrast, the obligation to recompense the
victim arises only if the defendant's act is wrongful and is not just the
innocent violation of a property right or the creation of a nonreciprocal risk.
Liability is negligence-based, not strict. For Weinrib, wrong consists in
119. For excellent and more extended critical discussions of the main correctie justice theories. see
Stephen R. Perry. The Moral Foundations of Tort Law. 77 IOWA L. REV. 449. 449-96 (1992). and Weston.
supra note 115, at 957-1000.
120. 1 do not say as much about Fletcher's view, because it is not as systematic as Wemnb's or
Coleman's account and serves at best as an explanation of "due care " It does not address whether
tortfeasors should pay their victims directly, nor does it give a complete account of the link between risk
creation and liability. I do not say as much about Epstein's view because it is unclear to %%hat extent his
is still a "corrective justice" view. See infra note 121. In any event, neither Fletcher's nor Epstein's account
bears any relation to what the authors of Exploring the Domain of Accident Law take to be 'corrective
justice."
121. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TIlE POWER OF E'tI.xENT DOMAIN
39-41 (1985); Richard A. Epstein. Causation-In Context: An Afterword. 63 Ciii.-KE.""T L REV 653.
657-64 (1987). In an earlier series of articles, Epstein emphasized the libertarian aspects of intemalizing
costs. See Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas tn a Systen of Strict Labilit. 3 J LEGAL
STUD. 165, 200-01 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harrmts. 4 J. LEGAL STLD 391. 441 (1975),
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151. 203-04 (1973) [hereinafter Epstein.
A Theory of Strict Liability]. The extent to which Epstein's theory could be considered noninstrumental
varies. The earlier Epstein was not receptive to economic theories of tort: the later Epstein is See JLLES
L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 273 (1992) (arguing that Epstein's early work "w as very much
antiutilitarian ... [and] antieconomic analysis." but that "Epstein no longer fears utilitarian or economic
analysis").
122. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utili' in Tort Theory. 85 HARV. L REV 537. 542 (1972)
[hereinafter Fletcher, Fairness and Utility]. But see George P. Fletcher. The Search for Synthesis in Tort
Theory, 2 LAW & PHIL. 63, 81-86 (1983) (arguing that risk analysis cannot reduce currently conflicted cx
ante and ex post modes of tort analysis to single framework for analyzing liability)
123. See Perry, supra note 119, at 469.
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infringing upon the autonomy, not the property, of another. With respect to tort
liability, wrong means imposing an unreasonable risk.t2 4 The wrongful act
may or may not cause harm; if it does, the actor owes restitution to the victim
to reestablish an equality of autonomy between them. Weinrib connects the
wrong with its consequent harm by appeal to Kant and (implicitly) Hegel: The
harm is the embodiment of the wrong.'
Jules Coleman's most recent theory acknowledges the importance of a
wrongful act tied to a harm, and the importance of requiring wrongdoers to
recompense their victims directly (Weinrib's "relational view"), but also sees
that reparation for the wrong may be separated from reparation for the harm:
"[R]epairing the wrong itself, the cornerstone of the relational view, is no part
of corrective justice at all. The view I want to defend is that the duty of
wrongdoers in corrective justice is to repair the wrongful losses for which they
are responsible."'' 26 The tort law duty to repair the harm, then, exists
alongside a criminal law duty to repair the wrong (through punishment or
apology). It is less clear, however, how wrong and harm come to be
connected.127 Liability for negligence is based on unreasonable risk, but
Coleman also allows for strict liability if a victim's right is violated. 2
In evaluating tort law by corrective justice standards, the authors of
Exploring the Domain of Accident Law note the diversity of views on the
124. See WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 152. weinrib explains:
Under the Kantian principle of right, the position of each party must be consistent with the
other's being a self-determining agent. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot demand that the law
regard as wrongful the creation of all risk; such a judgment of wrongfulness would render
action by the defendant impermissible, thus denying to the defendant the status of agent.
Similarly, the defendant cannot claim immunity regarding risks that could have been modulated;
that claim would ignore the effect of one's action on other agents and would treat them as
nonexistent. When combined, these two considerations constitute a standard of care in which
doer and sufferer rank equally as self-determining agents in judgments about the level of
permissible risk creation.
Id.
125. Weinrib explains why risk creation alone is not actionable:
For risk exposure to count as an actionable loss under corrective justice, the prospect of
bodily injury, rather than actual bodily injury, would have to constitute the violation of the
plaintiff's right. Conversely, the right would have to consist not in actual bodily integrity, but
in the absence of the prospect of injury. But the absence of the prospect of injury cannot count
as a right under the Kantian gloss of corrective justice. Rights are juridical manifestations of
the will's freedom. The absence of the prospect of injury is not in itself a manifestation of the
plaintiff's free will. In this respect, risk of bodily injury decisively differs from bodily injury
itself: a human being has an immediate right in his or her body because it houses the will and
is the organ of its purposes. The prospect of injury is, at most, something that may affect the
embodiment of the plaintiff's free will in the future. Therefore, security from this prospect does
not rank as a present right.
ld. at 157 (footnote omitted).
126. COLEMAN, supra note 121, at 324; see also Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of
Corrective Justice, 77 IOwA L. REV. 427, 441 (1992).
127. See Ernest J. Weinib, Non-Relational Relationships: A Note on Coleman's New Theory, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 445, 448 (1992); see also Linda Ross Meyer, Why Me?, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. (forthcoming Oct.
1997) (arguing that Coleman cannot retain relational account of tort without fuller account of
responsibility).
128. See COLEMAN, supra note 121, at 281-84.
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matter, though they cite only Weinrib's approach. Their choice of Weinrib to
represent corrective justice may be justified by his systematic account, but the
authors simply pick his theory without arguing its merits. Like many other
positions they take, their choice reflects unargued theoretical assumptions.
They assert that according to the perspective of corrective justice, the "purpose
of tort law" is to "oblig[e] a person whose morally culpable behavior has
violated another's autonomy to restore the latter as nearly as possible to his or
her pre-injury status."'2 9 Most corrective justice theories, the authors
continue, reject strict liability'30 and are skeptical of a large role for punitive
damages. The authors also assert that corrective justice theorists stress that the
form of tort litigation, in which a victim sues an injurer, cannot be explained
by either deterrence or compensation, since neither theory would require direct
interaction between these two actors.'
31
B. Evaluating Corrective Justice
The authors characterize optimal corrective justice in the following way:
An input evaluation of this goal focuses on many of the same
kinds of factors that are relevant to an input evaluation of the
deterrence goal: liability and damage rules should confront
wrongdoers with the full costs of injuries attributed to their
wrongdoing; victims should have ready access to the legal system;
claims should be accurately and promptly resolved; and liability
insurance should not insulate wrongdoers from the impact of the tort
sanction.
We assess progress toward the corrective justice goal measured
by outputs by trying to examine the following: the fraction of
wrongfully injured accident victims who actually receive
compensation, the frequency with which damages are awarded to
those not wrongfully injured or against those not wrongfully causing
the injury, and whether the measure of compensation actually received
is adequate or excessive.'
32
It is difficult to reconcile these factors with a noninstrumental
understanding of corrective justice. First, unlike evaluation of tort law in terms
of deterrence, liability and damage rules in a corrective justice paradigm define
129. DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3. at 8.
130. See id. This would not apply to Richard Epstein's correcttve justice theory. see" RiCIIARD A.
EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY (1980). nor to aspects of Coleman's theory. see COLEIAN. supra
note 121, at 281-84.
131. See DEWEES ET AL, supra note 3, at 8-9. Note that Jules Coleman's previous corrective justice
theory of "annulling" wrongful losses did not require interaction between the victim and the wrongdoer
See Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain. II J. LEGAL STUD. 421. 426 (1982). Jules L
Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice. 67 IND. L.J 349 (1992)
132. DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3. at 11-12.
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what counts as the full costs of injuries. Costs cannot be evaluated on any
other scale. Although it may seem that some injuries are not paid for by
defendants, to be compensated for proximately caused injuries"' is to be
fully compensated;'3 there is no other scale by which to measure full
compensation. Damages are limited by the principle of proximity precisely
because corrective justice demands that a relation be established between the
defendant's wrong and the plaintiff's harm. Otherwise, there is nowhere to
locate the corresponding duty to compensate and right to reparation. As
Weinrib puts it, "[t]he concepts of proximate cause and duty of care connect
wrongful doing to wrongful suffering by requiring the plaintiff's injury to be
the fruition of the unreasonable risk that renders the defendant's action
wrongful."'' 35 Second, corrective justice does not demand that victims be
compensated through the legal system. If tort law expresses norms of
corrective justice, then ideally parties would follow those same norms
voluntarily, without recourse to legal institutions. This conception differs from
deterrence or compensation theories, which tend to assume that state control
or coercion is required in all cases to ensure the appropriate redistribution of
wealth. Instrumentalist theories focus on providing the right incentives to
actors. The legal rules themselves carry no normative weight; they are merely
means to ends. The ultimate objective is to achieve the right societal balance
of risks and costs. If making the victim whole were unnecessary to achieve
efficient levels of activity or an appropriate distribution of resources, then it
would in fact be a bad idea to compensate victims. Any prelegal obligations
of corrective justice would just get in the way, and legal incentives would have
to be deployed to coerce actors to violate any such norms.
Corrective justice, by contrast, is not concerned with redistributing wealth
from the careless to the careful or from the poor cost spreader to the good cost
spreader; it does not see tort law as a response to market failure or as a tool
for encouraging efficient decisionmaking. The overall good of society is, in
some sense, irrelevant to a court dispensing corrective justice: It simply does
justice between the parties before it. Since justice may be done with or without
the courts, the frequency with which the courts are used is of little
133. No corrective justice theorist would venture that "proximate cause" states a precise test for
limiting damages. Instead, considerations of generality or particularity of risk that underlie determinations
of proximate cause merely "indicate the normative framework," WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 166, within
which judgments must be made about whether the injuries the victim suffered were the sort of injuries a
reasonable person "ought to have anticipated and guarded against," id. at 167, resulting from the sort of
risk that made the defendant's conduct negligent in the first place. See also COLEMAN, supra note 121, at
346-47 (arguing that compensable loss must fall "within the scope of the risks that make (the defendant's]
conduct at fault").
134. Although Professor Weinrib states that "tort law places the defendant under the obligation to
restore the plaintiff, so far as possible, to the position the plaintiff would have been in had the wrong not
been committed," WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 135, this clearly overstates the obligation, because proximate
cause analysis limits responsibility to the "sort of consequence that a reasonable person ought to have
anticipated and guarded against," id. at 167.
135. Id. at 164.
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significance. From this noninstrumentalist perspective, the courts simply
articulate and apply law that people should know (as a matter of practical
reason, if not theoretical reason) and follow on their own." '
There is a second aspect to the assumption that corrective justice requires
access to courts. Looking at law in terms of its deterrent effects takes a "bad
man"'137 view of those regulated. That is, it assumes that law is necessary to
provide incentives or disincentives, because without law, people would not do
what is right according to some further theory of "right."' 35 Corrective justice
136. Interesting empirical work has been done and could be done on the question of vhethcr and to
what extent tort law doctrine dovetails with jurors' intuitive understandings of responsibility See, e g . Neal
R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation. Reasonableness.
and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (1995). For accounts of the ways in which norms are used in
resolving disputes out of court, see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON. ORDER WmtOL'r LAWv How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (arguing that social norms, not legal norms. predominate, though
some social rules such as "let bygones be bygones" have legal analogues such as laches). PAMBELA J UTz.
SETTLING THE FACTS (1978) (presenting example of "pnncipled*" plea bargaining). Melvin A Eisenberg.
Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking. 89 HARV L REv 637. 639
(1976) ("[O]bservation suggests that [dispute] negotiation consists largely of the invocation. elaboration.
and distinction of principles, rules, and precedents."): and Marc Galanter. Justice in Mans Rooms Courts.
Private Ordering. and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM I (1981) (arguing that understanding
courts requires learning how they interact with other normative ordenngs that pervadc social life)
Advocates of corrective justice differ somewhat as to whether the public institution of courts is
necessary, as opposed to mediative solutions, for example. Stephen Perry. among others, seems to suggest
that the fundamental conceptions of corrective justice are moral, not autonomously "'legal." See Perry. supra
note 119, at 508-12. Ernest Weinrib, however, indicates that legal institutions are necessary
Although the parties may spontaneously observe the requirements of right either by forbeanng
from wrong or, once a wrong has occurred, by making or extracting proper amends, these
possibilities have no juridical standing since they presuppose in the parties an internal virtue
foreign to the externality of legal relations. Therefore. the public significance of wrong can be
signaled only by the availability of a coercion that represents the external operation upon the
parties of the concept of right.
WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 107. Yet legal institutions are necessary, on this view. not because the ascrage
person does not know the principles of justice or will not conform to them voluntanly. but because,
according to the Kantian/Hegelian conception of law, the state must bnng about moral ends by force of
will, joining moral necessity with physical necessity to make law actual. This philosophical mose reities
law through legal institutions, so that law has the binding character in actuality that it already has in reason
as morality, not because courts are the only way victims can receive their due from wrongdocrs WVennb
recognizes the external need for state coercion, but he also recognizes the internal obligatonness of legal
norms. See id.
Jules Coleman has asserted that the relational view of corrective justice (to vhich he. like Wcmnb.
now subscribes) "does not assert that there is only one institutional form through shich the debts under
corrective justice can be discharged." Coleman. supra note 126. at 436; see also Jules L Coleman. The
Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 53. 69 (David G Owen
ed., 1995) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS] ("[T]here may be duties of correcti'c justice even
in the absence of political institutions designed to enforce or implement them ")
137. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv 457. 459-63 (1897). reprinted in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLIES 391, 392-94 (Sheldon N1 Novick ed,. 1995) (arguing that law
should assume need to use threat of sanctions to deter wrongdoing by "bad man"). see also Sugarman.
supra note 94, at 561 ("[T]he general model posited is one in which people. like mice put in a
psychologist's maze of electrical shocks, are directed away from conduct that bnngs the sting of tort
liability and toward those channels of activity where the sting is avoided ")
138. This is not to say that deterrence or compensation theories require every case to proceed to rial
or even to court. Clearly, disputes are settled "in the shadow of the law," so that as long as the threat of
litigation exists in the background, law retains its coercive power. The difference with corrective justice
theory is that deterrence and compensation theories leave out the possibility that settling parties will use
the law as a norm, not just as a threat, even if courts are unavailable Corrective justice theory explicates
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need not make such assumptions. To repeat, empirical evidence of how many
plaintiffs are compensated through the tort system may tell us nothing about
whether corrective justice is being served. That may be happening outside the
legal system, as friends, neighbors, or strangers settle disputes on the basis of
prelegal norms of corrective justice.
Instrumentalist evaluations of law, by contrast, presume that state coercion
is necessary for some social good to be achieved. Usually, this is assumed to
be so because without institutions of coercion, the world is a grand prisoner's
dilemma in which all incentives support defection from the common good.
Goal-focused views of law also reflexively assume that humans themselves are
goal-focused: Humans act only to get something they want or need. If action
is directed by want, good itself comes to be defined by human will. 39 Hence
instrumental views of law go hand in hand with rational actor models of
human behavior: What is rational is choosing a means designed to get the most
of what I want.40 The authors' focus throughout on material incentives for
action suggests that they have been seduced by this habit of thought. For
example, in discussing the reduction in drunk driving accidents, the authors
assume the reduction resulted from stiffer penalties. They report that
"[e]vidence suggests that anti-drunk driving activist groups such as MADD
(Mothers Against Drunk Driving) successfully contribute to deterrence by
publicizing the consequences of drunk driving."'' Never considered is the
possibility that MADD may have awakened our consciences rather than our
self-interest. Setting this aside, however, from a corrective justice perspective
there is no alternative to preserving legal norms that require wrongdoers to
compensate their victims. Other compensation schemes that do not preserve the
bilateral relation between plaintiff and defendant and do not frame liability in
terms of duty, breach of duty, causation, and harm would not be adequate
substitutes for the court system. The only conclusion one might draw from
institutional inefficiencies would be that we need more courts, not that tort law
itself was not working and needed to be replaced or retooled.
Evaluating the "accuracy" of a decision for corrective justice purposes is
also problematic. Presumably one must reassess whether the defendant really
committed a wrong that proximately caused harm in the correct amount of the
plaintiff's damages. The evaluation assumes that the evaluator has at least all
the evidence available to the jury and at least as good an understanding of the
the normative force of the rules themselves, not just the beneficial effects of having them observed In most
cases.
139. For an examination of the way modem tort theory expresses a will-centered metaphysics, a
Nietzschean will to power, see Weston, supra note 115, at 1001-06. See also Richard Hyland, The
Spinozist, 77 IOWA L. REv. 805, 830 (1992) (arguing that "human law is not the product of the autonomous
human will," though legal theory assumes it is).
140. Jules Coleman accepts this premise, making his corrective justice theory a hybrid one. See
COLEMAN, supra note 121, at 303-11.
141. DEWEES Er AL., supra note 3. at 47.
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governing norms. Since noninstrumentalist theories, unlike deterrence theories,
have no outside criterion (such as efficiency) by which to evaluate outcomes,
evaluating accuracy requires reassessing the same evidence on the same
grounds that the jury used. 42 Even if a group of medical experts looking at
the medical record disagreed with a jury's decision about whether appropriate
procedures had been followed in a malpractice case, 4 ' corrective justice
theorists would not say this necessarily proved the jury's decision was unjust.
Perhaps the jury disbelieved the paper record and credited the testimony of a
witness or disbelieved a doctor. Perhaps the jury believed that a formerly
appropriate medical practice was itself now careless in light of new medical
techniques or knowledge. Or perhaps the jury decided the plaintiff had just not
proven her case, despite the availability of proof to others. The kind of inquiry
into accuracy that would make sense from a corrective justice perspective
would merely reiterate the trial and appeal process; it would not measure
anything beyond what legal institutions already assess. Given the limits of
empirical certainty in any investigation, it is hard to see why empirical
investigation would generate better or different kinds of information if it were
directed to answering the very same questions posed to judges and juries.
On the other hand, a corrective justice theorist would criticize a jury's or
judge's decision that was obviously based on instrumentalist thinking rather
than on legal principles.'" This criticism, however, focuses on the
justification for the decision, not its "accuracy." As long as the judge or jury
attempts in good faith to judge a case, the corrective justice advocate must be
satisfied, since the only alternative is, essentially, a second trial. Hence it
would be redundant from the standpoint of corrective justice to investigate
whether the assessment of liability or measure of damages in a particular case
was inaccurate. Any empirical efforts might be more profitably directed to the
still difficult task of discerning whether judges and juries employ law as it is,
or decide cases on instrumentalist grounds. 4 '
142. See WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 222 ("[Clorective justice does not antecedently determine the
uniquely correct result for particular cases."). For Weinib and Coleman. again. corrective justice is an
attempt to articulate the normative core of tort law. Where doctnne and norm are consonant. the law is
corrective justice, and there is no need to evaluate accuracy except to the extent of ensunng the law is
being followed. However, once the core of tort law is identified, these theorists do find some ton doctrines
inconsistent with norms embodied in the core. To this extent. corrective justice has prescnptions to make.
The prescriptions are based on internal coherence, not a greater social good, so they neither depend on
empirical fact nor provide a yardstick by which to evaluate trial outcomes that is external to legal doctrine
itself. See COLEMAN, supra note 121, at 6-9; WEINRIB. supra note 116. at 5.
143. See DEwEES E7 AtL, supra note 3, at 120-21 (arguing that differences between expert opinions
on complex medical procedures increase likelihood of inaccurate jury verdicts).
144. See WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 220-21 (contrasting two judicial opinions about proximate cause
on this basis).
145. See, e.g., Steven G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L REv. 1015. 1020-27 (1994)
(assessing whether or not courts and juries explicitly employ cost-benefit analysis).
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Finally, the authors suggest that liability insurance is contrary to corrective
justice principles. This argument, however, collapses corrective justice into
deterrence. Liability insurance may decrease deterrence by buffering actors
from the incentive to reduce risks, but corrective justice is not concerned with
incentives for reducing risks. The main issue is whether the defendant has
taken responsibility for the results of her wrongful conduct.
146
Of course, charging the authors with misunderstanding corrective justice
theory may be no great criticism. If corrective justice theories are splintered
and incoherent in any case, a polite, but failed, attempt to factor these theories
into the book's analysis should not be counted against the authors, but against
corrective justice theories themselves. Indeed, the authors express (politely)
what many tort scholars have said rather more baldlyt 47-that corrective
justice theory is irrelevant:
Critics of corrective justice theories of tort law question the
barrenness of noninstrumental rationales for tort law on the grounds
that they appear to ignore the relevance of the goals of both accident
reduction and accident compensation, which are likely to be the chief
concerns to most members of the community contemplating the likely
impact of an accident on their lives. To claim that tort law is
inherently incapable of serving these objectives is to avoid joining the
debate over whether tort law is worth preserving. 1
48
Yet corrective justice theories are important for what they try to achieve, even
if they ultimately fail. First, a corrective justice perspective takes tort law
seriously as law, that is, as norms we should respect and aspire to follow, not
just as policies designed to prod or coerce us into doing things we do not want
to do. Second, corrective justice perspectives recognize that wrongdoing creates
a relationship between a wrongdoer and her victim that needs to be recognized,
understood, and explained. Third, corrective justice theories search for (though
so far seem to miss) an important sense of responsibility that differs from the
mens rea approach of criminal law and yet better reflects the human condition.
Fourth, corrective justice seeks to understand the nature of the tort law duty
of care differently from cost-benefit analysis. As several of the policy
suggestions put forward by the authors here illustrate, these four objectives of
the corrective justice quest are not even open to question for advocates of
instrumental understandings of law.
146. Insurance can be one way to do so. See WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 136 n.25 ("Nothing about
corrective justice precludes the defendant from anticipating the possibility of liability by investing in
liability insurance.").
147. See Sugarman, supra note 94, at 609 ("[Ihe pursuit of corrective justice through ordinary torts
cases is an extravagance primarily benefiting lawyers and the insurance industry.").
148. DEWEES ElT AL., supra note 3, at 9.
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1. Law as Instrument vs. Law as Norm
H.L.A. Hart distinguishes two standpoints from which one may view
positive law. One may either take an "external standpoint," the "bad man"
standpoint mentioned by Holmes, or an "internal standpoint," the standpoint
of a member of a normative community.4 9 The first views law as a set of
penalties to be avoided. From this deterrence-based perspective, the law
involves no obligations; it is merely a fact about the world to take into account
in making one's self-interested decisions. The second understands law as
imposing "obligations," that is, providing reasons for taking action, which one
accepts as important and virtuous. Hart points out that these "standpoints" exist
in the ways we talk about the law: We can meaningfully say that someone
"ha[s] an obligation" even if he or she is unlikely to be prosecuted for
breaching it.'50 We can even say that someone "ha[s] an obligation" if that
person does not see or accept the norm invoked.S In other words, we
sometimes speak as if the law were an objective, binding norm. When we
speak this way, we take the internal standpoint. On the other hand, when we
predict whether a course of action will incur a penalty, or when we speak of
law as state coercion, we take the external standpoint. Hart believes that the
internal standpoint is not adequately captured by John Austin's traditional
positive law theory that identifies law with the threats of a sovereign.5 2 For
law to be different in kind from a gunman's pistol, Hart says, some account
must be given of the internal standpoint.
Deterrence-based theories undervalue the internal standpoint.
Understanding legal rules to be incentives rather than norms requires taking an
Austinian view of law. If one views tort law as a set of incentives, then the
concept of "wrong" tends to drop out. Instead, one imposes liability on the
agent who can avoid the loss at the least cost, regardless of any responsibility
for or connection with the victim. For example, if it turns out that wearing
seatbelts is the least costly way to avoid harm, tort law should impose liability
on those who do not wear seatbelts, regardless of the recklessness or even
intentional wrongdoing of other parties. 15 The only reason for imposing
liability on those who engage in intentionally harmful conduct, then, is that it
is cheap to avoid, not that it is wrong.
149. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAN 89-91 (Joseph Raz & Penelope Bulloch cds. 2d ed
1994) (1961).
150. See id. at 83.
151. See id. at 56-57 (arguing that existence of rule does not depend on individual psychological
feeling of being compelled, but on social "critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of beha,.tour as a
common standard"); see also id. at 88 (arguing that psychological feeling of being obliged and existence
of obligation are "different though frequently concomitant things").
152. See id. at 83-85.
153. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.4. at 169 t4th ed 1992) (arguing that
if plaintiff victim could have avoided accident at lower cost than defendant injurer. "[tlhe efficient solution
is to make the plaintiff 'liable' by refusing to allow him to recover damages from the defendant")-
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If legal rules have no independent moral force, but are coercive means
indistinguishable from the coercion employed by a bandit, then the deterrence
theorist must further justify this coercion by the end it is to achieve. The end,
usually some account of the collective good, must itself be justified. Since we
are assumed to be "bad men," the collective good cannot be equated with
enhancing human virtue. 1 4 Instead, law must appeal to considerations that
the "bad man" would find convincing, by proving that we get more of what
we selfishly desire by using law to curb the excesses of our fellows. 55 This
argument ultimately envisions humans as rapacious, selfish beasts, and law as
a coercive tool to keep us from destroying each other.
56
Compensation theories of tort law also see law as a tool, but not for
creating inducements to action. Instead, tort law is a tool for distributive justice
that ensures that the poor do not fall below subsistence level and that social
harms are borne equitably. Here again, wrong drops out of the picture, and
liability falls on those best placed to distribute or bear the losses. Institutional
compensation schemes seem to be the obvious alternative to merely shifting
a loss from one individual to another.
Corrective justice theorists argue that tort law serves goals other than
distributive justice. Taking their cue from Aristotle, who understood justice to
involve not only distributive justice but also corrective justice,' 57 the theorists
attempt to justify tort on nondistributive grounds. They shift their focus from
social cost, or harm, to wrong.' 58 It is a violation of an ethical duty, they
argue, to act without care for the safety of others. This duty correlates with the
right of the victim to expect compensation for wrongful loss. As opposed to
deterrence theories of tort, corrective justice theories emphasize the obligatory
force of tort law: It is wrong to be careless, violent, or deceitful; it is right to
compensate those one has wronged. As Kant pointed out long ago, to see
human beings as bound by (and hence capable of carrying out) obligations is
to see them as capable of free action in accordance with ideals of reason. 59
The good human life involves more than satisfying one's desires or having
154. Of course, "we" theorists may be "good men" trying to make rules for "bad men," in which case
virtue could be an end. But that assumes the existence of another standpoint, the internal standpoint, at least
for "us." Hence, "we" are not motivated by deterrents.
155. See, e.g., DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 8-17 (1986) (summarizing argument that
moral principles of cooperation would be adopted by self-interested rational actors).
156. An economist would argue that he is not committed to any view of human nature, but Is only
making a few assumptions that help predict behavior. See RICHARD A, POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 365-66 (1990). Yet these presumptions run contrary to, and leave no room for, the Internal
standpoint. To encompass both internal and external standpoints, a further theory is required about when
economic assumptions are appropriate.
157. See THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 114-17 (Sir David Ross trans., 1954).
158. This may be less true of Jules Coleman than of Ernest Weinrib. In Coleman's most recent work,
he focuses on the similarities rather than the differences between corrective and distributive justice. See
Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995).
159. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 79-80
(Thomas K. Abbott trans., 1949) (1785).
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sufficient resources to live; it requires living in virtue and honor by keeping
faith with one's duties of respect for self and others.
The appeal of the corrective justice theorists' focus on wrong is not lost
on the authors. They do suggest that tort law remain for victims of grossly
negligent, reckless, or intentional wrongs. Given the authors' unfavorable
assessment of tort law from a deterrence perspective, there seems a lingering
sense that there is something to the idea of corrective justice. Indeed, if
deterrence were the only concern, one need not make distinctions in
culpability. If we reason from deterrence considerations alone, we may find
that it takes a stronger sanction to command our attention and prevent
negligence than to deter intentional injuries, even though the latter are
considered more "wrongful."'" If tort is to be preserved for some reason
other than deterrence, then the authors must believe that it is important to
allow victims to face their wrongdoers and demand redress. They do not
explain, however, why these same sentiments of righting a wrong do not apply
to the careless as they do to the reckless.
2. Law as Sustaining Individuals vs. Law as Sustaining Relationships
Corrective justice theorists also try to understand the nature of the
relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim. Traditional tort principles,
of course, allow victims to sue their wrongdoers directly for compensation.
The drama of the trial allows the wrongdoer to face and explain her actions to
the victim and allows the victim to confront the wrongdoer. We retain an
intuitive sense that wronging another through carelessness, violence, or fraud
establishes a relationship and personal responsibility.' 6  Our frequent
insistence that our children undergo the torment of personal apologies when
they have wronged a neighbor demonstrates this intuition. Not only would the
relationship between wrongdoer and victim explain the bilateral nature of tort
160. Cf Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution. in RESPONSIBILITY. CHARACTER. AND
THE EMOTIONS 179, 184-85 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.. 1987) (arguing that detcrrenccrbascd thcories of
punishment do not explain inclination to punish).
161. Weinrib attempts to explain the relationship created between wrongdoer and %ictim as a kind of
unjust enrichment: The victim's loss is the wrongdoer's gain and supports a restitutionary obligation. See
WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 64-66. He recognizes that, as his critics point out. it is often hard to find that
a defendant gained anything corresponding to the victim's loss. See Perry, supra note 119. at 479-80. But
Weinrib insists that "the wrongful injury represents both a normative surplus for the defendant (who has
too much in view of the wrong) and a normative shortfall for the plaintiff (who has too little)." WINRtB,
supra note 116, at 117-18. The metaphor of normative gains and losses, however, assumes the relationship
it is designed to explain. It does not explain why, if the defendant's gain is only a normative one, the
defendant must pay monetary damages. As discussed below, the difficulty in correlating a defendant's
wrong with a victim's harm remains.
Other theorists invoke causation to explain the relation between plaintiff and defendant. See, e.g..
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 121, at 166-89 (describing four hypotheticals linking
plaintiff and defendant by means of causation). But causation itself is either too broad, since we affect each
other all the time in countless ways, or is a code word for other normative considerations that need to be
spelled out.
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suits, but it would also explain why torts committed within preexisting
relationships, especially trust relationships, seem to merit greater damages even
though they may cause no greater "harm." Deterrence and compensation
theories leave out this element entirely: It does not matter whether the
wrongdoer confronts the victim as long as the appropriate movement of social
resources is somehow arranged. 62 From this perspective, the authors'
suggestion that we move to no-fault compensation schemes supplemented by
experience-rated insurance misses this sense of personal responsibility.
Likewise, their focus on institutional actors rather than individual actors as the
locus of responsibility in the medical malpractice context is disturbing. As the
authors point out, institutions will not take cost-unjustified precautions; they
will deliver only economically rational medical care. Yet current attempts by
insurance companies to dictate treatment to physicians have met with
considerable ire from both patients and physicians.
63
When we are sick, we prefer personal responsiveness to economic
rationality. The authors find it a "pronounced" "inaccuracy" that juries award
more damages for medical malpractice than for similar injuries from other
causes.' 64 Yet they forget that juries may believe that when a physician is
negligent, she violates a special trust relationship, not just an efficient level of
162. The lack of this relational element led Jules Coleman to abandon his annulment theory of
corrective justice, which did not require wrongdoers to compensate victims directly, for a "relational" view.
See Coleman, supra note 126, at 433-37.
163. See, e.g., George Anders, Who Pays Cost of Cut-Rate Heart Care?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1996,
at B I (reporting that cost cutting by health maintenance organizations [HMOs] leads to inferior heart care);
Susan Harrigan, Worried Sick; Consumer Advocates Say HMO's Aren't Well-Enough Designed to Deal with
the Chronically Ill and Disabled, NEWSDAY, Mar. 12, 1995, at I (reporting criticism of clumsiness of
HMOs in handling medical problems and referring patients for inapt treatment); Vikram Khanna, Editorial,
The Warts, Flaws of Managed Care, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 23, 1995, at 6J (praising Maryland statute
requiring HMOs to pay for nonplan treatment and preventing them from coercing doctors' treatment
decisions); Kevin McDermott, Battle Set on Health Care Control, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 1996,
at IA ("The most common concern is that medical decisions are being dictated by financial issues-as
when mothers are released from hospitals too quickly after giving birth because of the strict coverage rules
imposed by their managed-care insurance companies."); Frank Reeves, Longer Hospital Stays for Birth;
Pa. Plans Hearings on Bill to Extend Insurance Coverage, PIrSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, July 16, 1995, at
Fl (detailing legislation to force HMOs to pay for longer hospital stay after birth); Jacqueline Shaheen,
Physicians Protest Maternity Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, § 13, at I (reporting doctors' criticism
of insurance companies' and HMOs' policies of paying for only 24-hour hospital stays after birth). The
Pennsylvania legislation discussed by Reeves was enacted, as was similar postpartum length-of-stay
legislation in 27 other states. See Capitol Report; Executive Action; Legislative Action; Maternity Coverage
Mandate Signed into Law, PA. L. WKLY., July 15, 1996, at 9; NJ Maternity-Stay Law Is Working, but
Similar Legislation Is Nixed in CA, MED. UTILIZATION MGMT., Aug. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File. The Clinton Administration endorsed, and the 104th Congress enacted, similar federal
legislation requiring health plans to cover at least 48 hours of hospitalization after birth. See Newborns'
and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 601-06, 110 Stat. 2874; Hillary
Rodham Clinton, Editorial, Congratulations, Mom, but Out You Go; Your Insurance Coverage Has Now
Expired, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 2, 1995, at All (endorsing legislation); Judy Packer-Tursman, Women's
Values Mold U.S. Agenda, Election, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTI, Sept. 25, 1996, at AI (reporting passage
of legislation); Robert Pear, Clinton Says Maternity Plans Need to Offer 2 Hospital Days, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 1996, § 1, at 27 (reporting President's endorsement of legislation).
164. See DEwEES ET AL., supra note 3, at 121.
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risk prevention. Hence the wrong seems greater than it might for a comparable
harm caused through the negligence of a stranger.
Of course, this sense of wrong is irrational from a compensation
perspective, because wrong should have nothing to do with measuring
economic loss. It is also irrational from a deterrence or efficiency perspective,
as it neither considers what incentives are necessary to deter, nor balances the
harm against the costs of precautions. From a deterrence perspective, breach
of trust should be punished more harshly only if there is some reason to think
trust-breachers are harder to deter.165 As in punishment theory, a focus solely
on deterrence does not capture our sense of the seriousness of the wrong,'6
so often an element in tort law. Corrective justice seems to seep back into the
analysis.
3. Responsibility for Harm vs. Responsibility for Wrong
As is apparent from the above remarks, corrective justice theorists focus
on the wrong rather than the harm in elucidating their understanding of tort.
The difficulty, however, is explaining why we require compensation according
to the extent of the harm rather than the extent of the wrong.' 7 In criminal
law, by contrast, punishment is usually meted out in accordance with the mens
rea and criminal history of the offender, not the extent of harm done to the
victim. 68 Exceptions, like the more serious punishment given the murderer
than the attempted murderer, provide the counterintuitive legal conundra that
keep scholars in business.'
69
Basing responsibility on mens rea or intent is a modem idea, which sees
human action as virtuous or vicious only insofar as it is within human control.
As good Kantians, we acknowledge that the only thing that can be virtuous or
165. Some economists have made this argument, on the basis that trust relationships usually involve
monitoring difficulties. Hence greater damages must be awarded for detected delicts to make up for the
advantages defendants reap when their conduct goes undetected. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J Freedman.
The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences. 66 N Y U L REv 1045.
1048-53 (1991). The argument is difficult to apply in the ton context. however. because defendants may
reap no advantage from careless activity. And at least tn the medical context, physicians are probably risk
averse and adopt defensive, non-cost-justified precautions because the standards of care are not alsays
clear. See DEWEES Er AL., supra note 3, at 106-07.
166. Deterrence lacks this moral dimension unless some measure of moral aserion is factored into
the "extent of harm" calculation, a possibility that the authors do not discuss.
167. See Coleman, supra note 126, at 439-41 (describing relational sie and proposing that
wrongdoers have duty to repair only wrongful losses that they caused).
168. One might object to this admitted generalization by pointing out that explicitly in the federal
sentencing guidelines, and implicitly in other sentencing contexts, the monetary amount of damage increases
the punishment. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2FI. I(b)(1) (1995) (setting graduated
sentences for fraud based upon amount of monetary loss). However, degree of harm is often a proxy for
the extent of culpability.
169. For a very different account of wrong, which argues that only a completed act. not an attempt.
constitutes a wrong, but leaves open the question how to distinguish culpably risky acts from morally
permissible ones such as building skyscrapers or selling sushi. see Heidi M. Hurd. "hat in the World Is
Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157, 189-208 (1994).
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vicious is our will, not the uncontrollable consequences of our conduct. 70
The will with which an act is done, then, is what matters; the external
circumstances or collateral harms are irrelevant. By the same token, the extent
of harm in the world is, on this account, morally irrelevant. Harm itself is not
wrong; natural disasters cannot be laid at the door of any moral agent. From
this Kantian perspective, which we all share insofar as the standard account of
criminal culpability seems intuitively right, tort law is puzzling. Why should
an inattentive driver be liable for millions for hitting a CEO with an eggshell
skull, while a drunk and reckless driver may only be liable for a broken
fender? If tort law is about righting wrongs, then damages should reflect the
wrong, not just the harm.
Deterrence and compensation theories that focus on minimizing or
distributing social costs avoid this problem, because the wrongfulness of the
defendant's conduct is not at issue; only the harm is important. From the
deterrence or compensation perspective, there is no need even to inquire about
the special nature of responsibility for consequences beyond one's control; the
only issue is who should pay for them. Deterrence theory answers that costs
should be placed on those best placed to avoid them; compensation theory
answers that costs should be placed on those best placed to spread them, Yet
the inquiry into the nature of responsibility is of central importance. Human
life, again to invoke Kant, lies at a metaphysical crossroads between
omnipotent thought and causal necessity.'' Our power to reason and our will
are within our control, but the world in which we try to act is not. To assess
responsibility solely on the basis of intent is to ignore that we are connected
to a world outside our minds; to assess responsibility for all consequences is
to treat ourselves as omnipotent. Responsibility for proximate harms in tort
requires a different account of what responsibility is from that which our
traditional or intuitive understanding provides, one that fits the odd
circumstances of being a rational mind in a contingent, material body.
So far, no corrective justice theorist has come up with a convincing
account of the connection between wrongs and harms, but the investigation
itself at least leaves open the possibility.'72 The instrumental theories of tort
law close off that discussion, a discussion that might not affect the accident
rate but might help us improve our self-understanding.
Particularly indicative of the authors' instrumentalist approach is that they
reject noneconomic damages in surprisingly perfunctory fashion. Even though
they acknowledge that noneconomic damages comprise sixty percent of all
170. See KANT, supra note 159, at 17-21 (stating that actions derive moral worth from "principle of
the will").
171. See id. at 30-31, 40-41, 78-79.
172. One admirable attempt at such an expanded account of responsibility, which argues that the
conception of the self should be expanded beyond the notion of free will, is Meir Dan-Cohen,
Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REv. 959 (1992).
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third-party liability compensation for motor vehicle accident injuries,' they
conclude with only a brief citation that "since monetary recompense can only
alleviate the suffering associated with pain and suffering, but not eliminate this
type of injury itself, it is questionable whether parties would rationally insure
against nonpecuniary losses."' 74 Leaving aside the rather puzzling distinction
between "alleviating" and "eliminating," it is surprising that the authors reach
this conclusion with no discussion, as the battles over tort reform have focused
so intensely on pain and suffering damages.' It is also surprising that no
mention is made of the role of pain and suffering damages in paying plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees and court costs, 176 or of their role in helping round out the
economic damages that the authors deem often deficient.'" Nevertheless, the
authors maintain throughout the book the rather strained position that although
pain and suffering damages are useful for deterrence purposes, because they
reflect "the full social costs" of accidents,' 8 they are unnecessary for
compensation purposes, because a "rational" self-insurer would not insure
against such losses. In their ultimate policy proposals, they take the latter
position that on sound insurance principles, noneconomic damages are
irrational.
79
As others have pointed out,' however, even on its own terms the
insurance argument goes only so far. If the injury results in hedonic
damages-that is, the impairment of a victim's ability to engage in sports or
hobbies that were formerly very important and pleasant to her-she may need
money to find substitutes, if substitutes are more expensive. Hence, the
victim's marginal utility for money may be greater than it was in her uninjured
state. Therefore, it is rational to spend more money on insurance, thereby
transferring money from the present, in which it is less valuable, to a possible
173. See DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3. at 32.
174. Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).
175. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pati and Suffering. A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries. 83 CAL. L. REv. 773. 776-77 (1995)
176. Perhaps this is because the United States is almost unique among legal systems in allowing
contingency fees. However, the authors are primarily discussing the relattiely large role played by
noneconomic damages in the United States.
177. See DEwEEs ET AL., supra note 3. at 33.
178. See id. at 17.
179. See id. at 427-36.
180. The marginal utility argument ignores the desire to equalize baseline utility across possible
futures. That is, even though I might enjoy opera less from a wheelchair, my need for any enjoyment at
all would be greater in such a state, and so I could rationally move resources from the present to such a
possible future even if I give up more marginal utility than I might gain. See Steen P Croley & Jon 0
Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pam-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Lai . 108 HARv L
REv. 1785, 1815-34 (1995) (arguing that consumers may rationally insure at cost of net utility. if utility-
equalizing gains relative to different pre- and post-injury bas lnes exceed such cost); Geistfeld. supra note
175, at 793-95 (arguing that consumers may rationally insure against pain and suffenng if it would increase
marginal utility of wealth, but not otherwise); Schwartz. supra note 88. at 364-66 (arguing that consumers
may rationally insure only partially against pain and suffenng that would increase marginal utility of
wealth, because positive income elasticity of demand for goods means that "'poorer" injured person will
demand less than full replacement of lost utility of not suffenng)
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future in which it is more valuable. Theory, then, cannot answer these
questions; only facts can. The authors' sources also argue that the
unavailability of first-party coverage for pain and suffering in the current
insurance market indicates that consumers do not wish to insure against pain
and suffering,'' but evidence cited by other commentators suggests that
consumers prefer to insure against some pain and suffering injuries.'82
Although these results would not necessarily justify complete compensation for
pain and suffering injuries, they certainly would warrant a closer look before
pain and suffering damages are eliminated entirely.1
8 3
I suspect that behind the uncontested acceptance of the self-insurance
argument against noneconomic damages lies another concern: how to make
universal no-fault coverage affordable and administratively feasible. Clearly,
administration of a no-fault insurance plan would be difficult if claims for pain
and suffering had to be adjudicated (though, of course, schedules or some other
form of cap could be used), and the compensation costs would rise. One may
still ask whether eliminating pain and suffering damages, while at the same
time ensuring "a high rate of replacement for income losses to achieve an
income level of, for example, 80% of after-tax earnings,"'84 is appropriate.
A child, unemployed person, or homemaker who suffers a permanent
disfigurement or painful, untreatable, permanent injury will receive less
compensation than a high-income earner who suffers a minor injury but loses
181. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 524 (1984) (cited in DEWEES Er AL., supra note 3, at 72 n.149).
182. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 180, at 1834-44; Geistfeld, supra note 175, at 795-96
nn.91-92. Schwartz also argues that the lack of a market for insurance against pain and suffering can be
attributed to adverse selection: Because of the insurers' inability to identify average risks, they cannot avoid
the situation in which only those who expected their suffering to be especially keen would buy insurance,
making such insurance too costly to offer. See Schwartz, supra note 88, at 364-65. Jules Coleman suggests
insurers may fear fraudulent claims. See COLEMAN, supra note 121, at 421.
Margaret Radin has another explanation for the failure of consumers to demand pain and suffering
insurance. She argues that consumers reject the idea that pain and suffering is commensurable with money
in the way the insurance argument would suggest. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES
197-99 (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 77 (1993).
She nonetheless does not reject pain and suffering damages, since they represent an affirmation of wrong
and a tangible message to the victim that her suffering is taken seriously. See RADIN, supra, at 201-02
(arguing that rules governing pain and suffering damages should reflect people's commitment to
incommensurability). She proposes a "noncommodified conception of compensation":
I want to call to mind the following possibility. Requiring payment is a way both to bring
the wrongdoer to recognize that she has done wrong and to make redress to the victim. Redress
is not restitution or rectification. "Redress" instead means showing the victim that her rights are
taken seriously. It is accomplished by affirming that some action is required to symbolize public
respect for the existence of certain rights and public recognition of the transgressor's fault in
failing to respect those rights. In this conception of compensation, neither the harm to the victim
nor the victim's right not to be harmed is commensurable with money. Neither is conceptually
equated with fungible commodities.
Id. at 188.
183. See Schwartz, supra note 88, at 366 ("IThe ideal legal rule regulating accidents causing mental
losses that increase people's marginal utility for money would award victims partial damages.").
184. DEWEEs Er AL., supra note 3, at 427.
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a few days of work.15 Of course, the authors acknowledge that insurance
premiums would be adjusted accordingly by income, i " so that high-income
drivers would pay higher premiums for their higher prospective returns. But
without the tempering effect of noneconomic damages, there is a danger that
the significance of injuries and the persons injured will be seen solely in
economic terms. Some members of society will simply be expendable, their
injuries insignificant. 87  If it turns out that we are all hard-headed
economists, there should be no problem with such a system.
The problem, however, is deeper. Tort law has traditionally allowed
damages for something like lost dignity. Assault actions compensate not just
for physical harm, but also for affront. Defamation actions compensate for lost
reputation, not just economic loss. Privacy actions protect personal freedom
and self-presentation. It is only in the world of law and economics that we
think of physical injury solely in economic terms. There has traditionally been
a "wergeld"' 8' 8 aspect to personal injury damages, a sense that a tortfeasor
owes compensation not just for medical bills, but for lost dignity, freedom, and
self-determination.1 89 These harms are now subsumed into "pain and
sufferina," but this rather demeaning appellation should not obscure the loss
of human possibility. A child, for example, may not have a distinguished (or
high-paying) profession now, but who knows what might have been? The
"equality" of noneconomic damages reflects that unknowable loss of potential
that must be attributed to every human being regardless of her present level of
achievement. Human life is not static. Ironically, to deny this basic equality of
loss is to return to a true "wergeld" system where compensation is accorded
on the basis of status: knights and lords worth more than serfs, CEOs and
stockbrokers worth more than social workers and school teachers.
185. To be fair, the authors envision a deductible for short-term income losses. lee id. so this precise
scenario would not occur. However, the deductible is not meant to address the problem presented here. but
rather the authors' concern for "moral hazard," i.e.. false claims of injur made in order to ha% c a nice. paid
vacation from work.
186. See id. at 38.
187. I assume that the authors would respond that any such "message" goes not to the compensation
concern, but to the deterrence concern, and it would be countered by regulator) enforcement and the
residual role left for intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent tort litigation. Or perhaps they would respond
that I am guilty of making unwarranted empirical assumptions about how people %%Ill understand the la%%
188. Wergeld was an Anglo-Saxon schedule of tort/crime penalties to be paid to the victim of a w,.rong.
or to the family of a decedent. The extent of the wergeld owed depended upon the status of the victim See
James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Crininal Lau. 76 B U L REV 29.
53 (1996); see also Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines. 364 P2d 337. 345 (Cal 1961) (Traynor. J.
dissenting) ("Such [noneconomic] damages originated under primitive la%% as a means of punishing
wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those who had been wronged.") (citations omitted)-
189. 1 use the term "compensation" in the text loosely. As Radin has pointed out. noneconomic injuries
are not commensurable with money. See RADIN, supra note 182. at 201-02: Radin. supra note 182. at 77
We pay pain and suffering damages, indeed, as a kind of "wergeld" to shoss remorse and respect, not to
wipe out the injury. Radin's conception, however, makes it difficult to distinguish pain and suffering
damages from punitive damages. The conceptual tightrope exercise required is to focus on the loss, not the
wrong, even though the loss is not "compensated" but only "acknowledged" by money damages.
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Corrective justice theorists might conclude that the "harm" to be
compensated by tort damages is not just economic harm, but lost human
possibility."9 If human beings are at the metaphysical crossroads between
omnipotence and necessity, then harm in human terms is not just what results
from a collision of molecules, but what happens to the soul or spirit. Harm
done in this sense may even correspond to the intent with which it was
inflicted. As Justice Holmes said, "even a dog distinguishes between being
stumbled over and being kicked."' 19' Pain itself is a social construct, to some
extent. The discomfort experienced by a marathon runner or a mother in labor
is different in kind, though perhaps not in degree, from that of an accident
victim. Traditional tort doctrine allowing nominal recoveries for intentional
wrongs but not for negligent wrongs reflects this truth, 92 as does allowing
juries to compensate victims for humiliation and embarrassment as well as for
physical harms.' 93 Conversely, the traditional rule barring tort compensation
for purely economic harm may be understood as a recognition of the
immaterial nature of the loss tort law is meant to redress. 194 "Pain and
suffering" damages, then, may be an appropriate counterpart to the wrong and
therefore suitable as compensation, allowing a jury to compensate for indignity,
not just indisposition. Hence, the distance between wrongs and harms may be
bridged a bit: Like wrongs, harms are features of human experience, not
objective facts, and are measured by lost human possibility and moral pain,
both of which increase with the extent of the wrong, not only with the extent
of physical damage.
4. Cost-Benefit Analysis vs. The Duty of Care
Finally, corrective justice theories treat carefulness as a duty, not just a
calculation of advantage.' 95 They try, in other words, to set forth a
deontological account of tort law, just as other theorists have tried to articulate
deontological theories of contract or criminal law.
19 6
As other authors have pointed out, however, tort law presents a special
challenge in this regard, because it is necessarily concerned with tough trade-
190. But see Bruce Chapman, Wrongdoing, Welfare, and Damages: Recoveryfor Non-Pecuniary Loss
in Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 136, at 409 (arguing that corrective
justice theory would prohibit award of noneconomic damages because plaintiff could use them only for
goods unrelated to loss).
19 1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 188 1), reprinted
in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JuSTIcE HOLMES, supra note 137, at 109, 116.
192. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 37 & n.29
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); id. § 12, at 57; id. § 54, at 361.
193. For example, the Second Restatement of Torts allows recovery of damages for invasion of
privacy, including "emotional distress or personal humiliation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521-I
cmt. b (1977).
194. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 192, § 92, at 657.
195. This is connected to the discussion of the "internal standpoint." See supra Subsection III.B.I.
196. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Moore, supra note 160.
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offs and requires consequentialist reasoning. Heidi Hurd has argued, for
example, that corrective justice theories cannot be based on a purely
deontological account of negligence.' 97 In part, her conclusion is based on
a definition of deontology that requires general rules, not context-based
judgments. Because the duty of care cannot be reduced to a list of do's and
don'ts, 198 but must be decided on the basis of an assessment of the possible
consequences of different courses of action, Hurd concludes that negligence
liability necessarily turns on consequentialist considerations: t 9 "In many
circumstances one's decisions appear exempt from the application of
deontological norms, so that the right decision to make is the decision that
maximizes good consequences." 2"
Though much of this debate turns on what counts as "deontological,"'
corrective justice theorists face a serious difficulty in trying to articulate a duty
of care that does not dissolve into cost-benefit analysis. If we simply have a
duty to engage in cost-benefit analysis, then corrective justice adds little to the
instrumentalist conception of tort. The only difference between a deterrence
theorist and a corrective justice theorist on this account would be that the
deterrence theorist would not use the language of duty, but would instead
establish legal standards to ensure that it was in the actors' interest to take into
account all the relevant costs of their conduct. As many deterrence theorists
have argued, negligence law (if negligence law is understood to require cost-
benefit analysis) already does so. There would be no difference in legal
standards; the difference would be rhetorical only. Sorely needed, then, is an
197. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence. 76 B.U. L. REv 249. 251. 272 (1996)
198. For an example of this problem, see the famous exchange between Oh'er Wendell Holmes.
attempting to lay down a workable rule of due care for crossing railroad tracks in Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927), and Benjamin Cardozo's response in Pokora %, Wabash
Railway, 292 U.S. 98, 101-06 (1934). that no valid general formulation of the rule was possible Although
Cardozo's opinion purported not to overrule Holmes's categoncal statement of the rule. it is understood
to have done so. See Justice v. CSX Transp.. Inc.. 908 F2d 119. 123 (7th Cir 1990)
199. See Hurd, supra note 197. at 251, 272.
200. Id. at 253.
201. See, e.g.. Kenneth v. Simons. Deontology. Negligence. Tort. and Crime. 76 B U L REv 273.
285-95 (1996) (taking issue with Hurd, especially as to whether deontology requires categorical
prohibitions). Indeed, some of the comments Hurd makes sound utilitarian, not deontological Because one
only pays damages when harm occurs. "if negligence is to be given deontological content, its essential
nature must be thought to lie in the materialization of risks, and not i risks themselves" Hurd. supra note
197, at 265. If "negligence" in this sentence means carelessness, she is simply identifying carelessness with
causing harm, as would a strict liability theory. This is certainly more consistent with utilitananism. which
evaluates the goodness or badness of human action solely by the consequences it causes, than vith
deontology, which would evaluate the actor's conduct ex ante.
Also odd is Hurd's argument that deontology does not mandate a duty not to be negligent See id
at 253. Is it not a violation of a categorical prohibition to refuse to consider how one's actions affect
others? At the least, one would expect a deontologist to assert that there is a deontological obligation to
consider such consequences-a duty. if you will. to employ consequentialist reasoning The obligation
would be met if the agent made the most prudent decision possible. given the information he or she had
Hence, the duty would not be determined ex post by whether or not he or she turned out to be right (the
consequences), but by the nature of the actor's action.
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account of the corrective justice duty of prudence and care that shows some
difference from standard cost-benefit analysis.2t 2
The limitations apparent in the authors' discussion of cost-benefit analysis
may suggest some possibilities. Though the authors consistently call for more
cost-benefit analysis, especially in the context of government regulation, they
acknowledge the difficulty of evaluating the benefits of more costly
precautions. The benefit calculation depends on how much value is assigned
to life and limb, as well as difficulties in predicting the effects of the
precautions; benefits may continue for a long time, but costs are incurred
immediately. Sometimes the authors conclude that benefits receive too much
emphasis,0 3 while at other times they seem to suggest that benefits are
slighted.2° Similarly, the authors do not even try to suggest an appropriate
value for a life, though they argue that "more systematic application of cost-
benefit methodology, even employing relatively high values of life and
physical integrity, is likely to substantially enhance regulatory
performance."20 5
But we know that even one's valuation of one's own life can fluctuate
madly, depending on how one values one's riskier pleasures or assesses one's
importance to others. For example, I loved skydiving when I was younger, but
I gave it up after I was married and had a child. Does that mean that my life
was less valuable then, or simply that I value the lives of others close to me
more now? On the other hand, if my child needed to eat, I would take a risky
job to feed her. Does that mean my life would become less valuable?
Assessing the value of life from the perspective of value to others is also
frightening. Am I more valuable if I make more money? If I have dependents?
202. Weinrib, for example, argues that the duty of care should consider only the possible harm, not
the cost of precautions, so that it is not taken for granted that the activity in which defendant is engaged
ought to continue ("activity level" in economic parlance). See WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 147-52.
However, this argument seems inconsistent with his assertion that "doer and sufferer rank equally as self-
determining agents in judgments about the level of permissible risk creation." Id. at 152. If they are equal,
then should the defendant's costs of precaution (including the value of defendant's activity) not be balanced
against the benefits of those precautions to the plaintiff (including the value of plaintiff's activity)?
Epstein's early theory would establish a duty of compensation whenever defendant causes plaintiff's
right to be violated, regardless of the cost to defendant. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, supra note
121, at 168. The decision about when a defendant is a cause, however, may itself be based on an analysis
of costs. See Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV.
1291, 1320-35 (1992).
George Fletcher's theory would establish a duty of compensation whenever a defendant imposes a
nonreciprocal risk, regardless of cost. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 122, at 542. The idea
of reciprocity, however, seems to refer back to underlying customs about what kinds of risks are acceptable,
common, and therefore reciprocal. These customs themselves make tradeoffs between risks and benefits,
but they are so habitual and backgrounded that we usually do not reopen the balancing question. See infra
notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
203. See DEWEES ET AL., supra note 3, at 239 ("[Blenefits [of safety regulations for products] are
realized over an extended period and must be discounted accordingly ....". ).
204. See id. at 321 ("[Blenefit estimates generally focus on short-term effects [of pollution
remediation], ignoring the long run.").
205. Id. at 239.
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If I do "socially beneficial" work? If I am the world's greatest basketball
player or the world's greatest brain surgeon? In short, as myriad commentators
have pointed out, there is no "neutral" way to value a life, and the authors do
not suggest one. Yet they insist on cost-benefit analysis as an appropriate way
to evaluate regulatory decisions.
Tort law traditionally has ducked these problems by focusing on customary
or "reasonable" standards of care, rather than trying to evaluate anew the cost
of precautions vis-a-vis risks. 20' Behind this "custom," however, lurks a
notion of what constitutes a human life worth leading. Even custom agrees that
we must risk our lives to some extent in order to live them fully. We must
make these tragic choices. °7
What cost-benefit analysis misses, however, is that in evaluating "life," a
focus on human freedom, not money, might be more appropriate. '3 What
human activities and possibilities and ideals are made possible by taking a
particular risk, and how many lives must be jeopardized for those possibilities
to be realized? Some risks are necessary in order that human life can merely
continue-for example, we must grow food, and producing food exposes
agricultural workers to many dangers. Other risks are necessary to enhance
the quality or excellence of human life. Here we trade quantity for quality.
Among other benefits, building a new highway (which requires risking human
injury) creates the opportunity for workers to commute from longer distances,
giving them more choices about where to live. Behind every evaluation of the
costs and benefits of a particular course lie normative evaluations about quality
of life and tragic trade-offs.
Economics-inspired risk assessment seeks to avoid making such normative
evaluations precisely because they are so bitterly contested. Instead, it looks
to market mechanisms to find how "we" actually evaluate the trade-offs. These
206. See Gilles, supra note 145, at 1015-19 (commenting that juries recicte *'reasonable person"
instructions rather than cost-benefit balancing instructions). Indeed. even in United States v Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), in which Learned Hand articulates his famous rssk-benefit standard of
negligence, custom wins out over cost-benefit analysis. The issue in the case is whether the owner of a
barge is careless in failing to have a bargee present on a ship to guard against the ship's slipping its
moorings and damaging others' property. Hand nowhere in the opinion evaluates the costs vcrsus benefits
of having a bargee present on the ship at all times (or of having shifts of bargees rotate their guard duty),
but assumes that the bargee must only be on the barge "during working hours." unless he has some excuse
for being absent. See id. at 173. Hand does no accounting to determine his standard of care, but assumes
the reasonableness (and cost-effectiveness) of having (one) bargee present during usual working hours. See
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 121, at 154-55 (discussing Hand's acceptance of custom
and excuse).
207. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES. AND THE LAW 65-68 (1985) (explonng
how reasonable person standard is used to make trade-offs between fundamental ideals, not just to promote
efficiency); GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBtTr, TRAGIC CHOICES 167-91 (1978) (examining different
issues in different societies to demonstrate role of culture in resolution of choices between moral, economic.
and other values).
208. See WEINRIB, supra note 116, at 151-52; see also supra note 124.
209. A higher proportion of workers is killed or disabled on the job in agriculture (including forestry
and fishing) than in mining and quarrying or in construction. See BUREAU OF'rIlE CESUS. U S. DEP'T OF
COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995. at 440 tbl.688 (I 15th ed. 1995)
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market mechanisms are faulty, of course. Even the relatively unproblematic
assessment of how much a particular safety measure will cost a company (in
lower profits, for example) makes many assumptions. The "cost" of a safety
measure does not usually reflect its social cost (the loss of utility of the
product "as is," including perhaps its availability at a lower price), but the cost
to the company. If the cost to the company is too high, and it cannot turn a
profit after installing the safety device, then it or its product line will not
survive. There is, however, the possibility that the society as a whole would
be better off if the product were not produced at all, even though there may
be consumer demand. For example, it may be very lucrative to market a
dangerous children's toy, but that profit does not reflect the actual benefit of
the product to society. When courts do "cost-benefit" analysis, they do not
look to the costs to the company of the safety measures, but at least in part to
"[t]he usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to
the public as a whole. 2 '0 To assume that the costs to the company are the
same as the costs to society is to assume a perfect market in which the utility
of a product is reflected in its price. Though the authors believe consumers
make such rational choices, the facts (and our own irrational purchases) do not
bear this out.2 11 Price and cost figures cannot substitute for normative
evaluations. Our reflexive consumer preferences constantly change and may be
greatly influenced by advertising. Nor do reflexive preferences, like the sudden
craving for a Big Mac, necessarily reflect our reflective ideals-the preferences
we aspire to have. Similarly, attempts to project what prices might be like in
a perfectly competitive world are simply normative decisions about relative
worth in disguise.
212
210. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983). O'Brien was overturned by N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West, 1987) insofar as the case endorsed the application of risk-utility analysis when
a plaintiff failed to establish a product defect under the "consumer expectations" test, i.e., that an ordinary
consumer would not have recognized the danger as an inherent characteristic of the product. See Dewey
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252-53 (NJ. 1990).
211. Cf OSCAR WILDE, AN IDEAL HUSBAND, act 2, lines 152-53 (A & C Black 1993) (1895)
("[W]hen the gods wish to punish us they answer our prayers .... ").
212. These points have been made again and again, and more eloquently, by critics of cost.benefit and
general economic analysis. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981) (criticizing "liberal" law and economics school of thought and
arguing that use of efficiency criterion to generate complete system of private law rules is incoherent);
Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849 (1987) (criticizing cost-benefit analysis
by means of market-inalienability theory neglected by Law and Economies scholarship); Mark Sagoff,
Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393, 1410-11 (1981) (criticizing cost-benefit
analysis as unable to measure merits of given belief because of tendency to confuse categories of wants);
Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 225 (1974) (criticizing cost-
benefit analysis in that "[a]s long as policies are intended to maximize the general satisfaction, they will
be no better ... than the interests they serve"); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
LJ. 1539, 1548-49 (1988) (noting that in republican theory, existing preferences and entitlements should
not be assumed to be static); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1129 (1986) (criticizing notion that existing private preferences should be accepted as basis for
governmental decisionmaking); James B. White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN.
L. REV. 161, 164 (1986) (arguing that there is "a deep conflict" between economic analysis and "the
intellectual and social practices that have characterized American law from the beginning"); see also JANE1
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Hence the common law's reliance on "custom" as a proxy for
reasonableness takes on a new significance. "Custom" includes the normative
ideals many take for granted in everyday life. In everyday activities such as
walking, driving, fixing our houses, etc., we have fairly well-established ideas
about what risks are worth taking. When we consider activities that are not so
common, our intuitions of "reasonableness" fail us, so that the standards for
pollution, dangerous chemicals, etc., are not already worked out in the
background habits of life. Instead, we must make the normative trade-offs
explicit. Cost-benefit analysis is touted as a way to make those trade-offs
explicit, but only by reducing all normative value to a common coin. A million
dollars is obviously too great a cost to save three hundred thousand dollars.
But it is much harder to say that a cheaper car that will make driving and
different housing or job opportunities affordable to thousands more people is
worth the lives of fifty who will die for lack of expensive safety equipment.
Due care is never a single scale maximization of a single good. It is a complex
normative decision often involving irreconcilable conflicts between important
values. We should not forget that we stand with Agamemnon, who had to
choose between failing in his oath to his brother and his duty to his country,
and sacrificing his daughter.2"3 To mask the tragedy of such a choice in a
balance sheet is to lose ourselves.
C. The Domain of Corrective Justice
Given that corrective justice theory may serve an important role in
providing an account of tort law that unearths its normative basis, what
follows? Is the authors' analysis of the beneficial or deleterious effects of tort
law beside the point? Not at all. It is still useful to evaluate the expense and
collateral effects of a system of law. Certainly, we can look to other ways to
buffer ourselves against losses and to decrease the costs of accidents. The most
corrective justice theorists might say (and some, like Weinrib, do not go even
that far) is that tort law should be preserved because it rights wrongs, even if
other institutions take on the roles of compensation and accident
prevention.z 4 Indeed, part of the point of corrective justice theory is that the
SMILEY, Moo 31-33, 65-69 (1995) (satirizing economics professor devoted to cost-bencfit analysis in every
aspect of life).
213. See EURIPIDES, Iphigenia at Aulis. in THE WAR PLAYS 1. 9-10. 57 (Don Taylor trans., 1990)
214. Indeed, although the authors struggle to evaluate corrective justice from an instrumental
standpoint throughout the book, they recognize its noninstrumental value, though they limit its scope to
more egregious forms of wrongdoing: -'[Tlhe tort system in the reduced domains that we leave to it would
serve principally to vindicate traditional corrective justice values, unencumbered by other values that it
cannot simultaneously or effectively advance." DEWEES ET AL.. supra note 3. at 437. Richard Wright would
go so far as to say that tort law should be preserved to right wrongs even if other institutions assume the
functions of deterrence and compensation, and he criticizes Weinib and Coleman for not opposing the
elimination of tort in favor of alternative compensation schemes. See Richard W Wright. Substanive
Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 625, 628 (1992).
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tort system is not really about compensation or accident prevention; these
benefits are at best collateral. Taking some of the pressure off tort law by
providing alternative insurance schemes, for example, might help keep tort
doctrine from being torqued to serve goals, like deterrence and compensation,
that are inherently in tension.
IV. CONCLUSION: JUST THE FACTS?
Although Exploring the Domain of Accident Law does not eliminate the
need for theorizing about tort law, as its authors ambitiously claim, it is a very
important collation and analysis of much of the quantitative and econometric
work comparing tort law's ability to compensate and deter to that of other
systems of regulation. It would be a great mistake, however, to read this
account of tort law as resting on nothing but the facts. The book has two
central theoretical premises. First, corrective justice values make little
difference to the authors' policy conclusions, which amount to an implicit
(though not explicit) rejection of corrective justice. This rejection precludes
discussing the merits of pain and suffering damages, of proceedings in which
plaintiffs recover directly from defendants, and of normative accounts of tort
law and its standard of care. Second, the authors tend to resolve uncertainties
in the empirical record in favor of approaches that resemble, as much as
possible, workers' compensation law. Unlike many who hypothesize a perfect
market, and perhaps because of their Canadian experience, these authors do not
fear centralized solutions to compensation, such as national health insurance,
or centralized solutions to deterrence, such as government regulation. But they
prefer market-based approaches: regulations that encourage information flow
to consumers and that allow industry actors to decide for themselves what the
most efficient form of risk management will be. Consequently, the authors
look to experience-rated, industry-specific insurance to provide both
compensation and deterrence in a single blow, wherever such insurance is
feasible.
Given this strong theoretical preference, derived from the authors'
economic bent, there are inexplicable omissions-they never investigate the
insurance industry itself to see under what circumstances insurance companies
accurately price policies to reflect claims experience; they never examine how
experience rating will affect smaller entities more likely to be at the mercy of
bad luck than carelessness; and they never inspect how the regulation of
insurance affects its availability and risk allocation. Alas, even the best
detective must use hypothesis as well as induction.
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